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1. Introduction 
In this thesis I will be looking at the philosophical debate surrounding ecological 
restoration of nature. The issues surrounding the environment and especially 
environmental degradation are very topical in current academic, scientific, philosophical 
and everyday discussions. One of the most prominent examples of an environmental 
issue must be global warming. This indicates that humans are becoming more aware of 
their impact on their surrounding environment. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 2013 report states that “[i]t is extremely likely that human influence has 
been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century”1 (IPCC 
2013). At first glance it seems like humans have finally awaken to the possibility that 
collective human action can have global detrimental effects. Climate change, ever 
growing population and growing consumption all threaten natural environments, 
wellbeing of ecosystems and biodiversity. These issues bring forth the opportunities and 
possibilities of ecological restoration. What if humans had the technology and 
knowledge to fix some of these problems caused by the excessive human lifestyle? 
Consequently the philosophical study of ecological restoration is extremely topical and 
will help us understand the human place in the world and teach us more about our 
relationship with nature. 
However, it is important to point out that environmental concern is not a new 
phenomenon (Oksanen 2012, 17-21). Humans have throughout history discussed their 
relationship with nature and regulated their actions which would otherwise lead to 
negative impact on the environment. For example, in ancient Greece deforestation lead 
to permanent modification of the landscape which then lead to the degeneration of the 
potent society as a whole. This seems to be the pattern that human life has followed 
since its inception. “Contemporary humans are merely following a time-honored 
tradition, but with a significant difference: The modern global economy recreates the 
pattern on a much larger scale.” (Throop 2000, 11.) In the past humans used to deal with 
degradation of their environment by moving to new unspoilt areas (Hargrove 1989, 48-
72). However, with seven billion people inhabiting the Earth at the moment, this is not a 
possibility anymore – we are running out of space. As stated by William Throop, “[i]t 
                                                            
1 The report offers an interdisciplinary overlook into the causes, issues and possible solutions to climate 
change. 
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seems that we must clean up our mess” (Throop 2000, 11). Restoration is the human 
attempt to clean up the mess we have created.  
Even though ecological restoration, as a separate field from ecology, is only in its 
infancy, arising in the 1980s, humans have practised ecological restoration for hundreds 
or even thousands of years (Bratton 1992, 53). But the 1980s would be the landmark for 
the birth of restoration as a systematic science. In 1982 this it gave rise to a journal 
called Restoration and Management Notes. This journal had topics ranging from 
scientific papers, restoration projects, political aspects of restoration, philosophical 
investigation of restoration offering a forum for multidisciplinary investigation of the 
topic. Later in 1989 the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) was created and a few 
years later in 1993 it gave way to a new journal Restoration Ecology. (Throop 2000, 
12.) 
The topic of ecological restoration is particularly elucidating when it comes to 
environmental philosophy. Most environmental philosophers claim that nature has value 
and should be conserved. This is why conservation debate is at least among 
philosophers, fairly straight forward. Most philosophers and most humans would admit 
that nature has value. What usually causes difficulty for these debates is what type of 
value is designated to nature. Is it instrumental or is it intrinsic value? Nonetheless, 
most people would agree that it is wrong to destroy nature for no good reason.  
In comparison the restoration debate seems less straightforward. Restoration seems to 
illuminate the problematic concept of nature in a better way compared to conservation. 
Restoration is like a prism that refracts fascinating issues with nature and our 
relationship with it that might otherwise remain hidden. Restoration cases are 
particularly interesting, because naturalness seem to have been lost, at least this is what 
some philosophers claim. The philosophical reflection on restoration is very 
multifaceted because it goes into the heart of the debate of what is natural, what is 
meant by “nature” and what it is exactly that makes nature valuable? The debate is 
located in the borderland of natural and artificial, human and nature, valuable and non-
valuable, and that is what makes it so interesting.  
If restoration destroys the “naturalness” of nature making the area artificial or non-
natural, the question remains, why restore? What are we restoring? If we are aiming to 
restore natural value, can it even be restored? This is exactly what I am interested in 
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finding out – ‘can we restore previously natural areas and if we can should we’? What 
happens to the once natural area after it has undergone the restoration process? How do 
we define our willingness to intervene with natural processes and our insistence to fix 
things? Is it hubris or human chauvinism, our ambition to control the uncontrollable? Or 
does it show that there is much more to restoration that meets the eye, that we are not 
only restoring a natural area but restoring our relationship with nature?  
In this thesis I will look at how different environmental philosophers try to make sense 
of how we should understand and define ecological restoration. I will also be looking at 
the ethical implications that would follow from the definition. I will begin by looking at 
important conceptual and theoretical issues that are closely intertwined with ecological 
restoration. I will do so by looking at restoration through four categories: goals, values, 
means and overall attitude. I believe these categories will serve to focus and bring 
important aspects of restoration into surface which might otherwise remain hidden. I 
will then look at different ways philosophers have approached the issue of ecological 
restoration. I have chosen to investigate the theories of Robert Elliot, Eric Katz’s and 
Andrew Light, because these three philosophers represent different approaches to the 
restoration debate and have all contributed and remain influential in the philosophical 
debate of restoration. I will then take a closer look at the concept of ‘nature’ and 
‘wilderness’ and look how these affect the restoration debate. I will do this analysis 
from the perspective of ecological restoration. I believe nature and wilderness to be 
important concepts that feed into the concept of restoration. It is important to mention 
that the debate surrounding the concept of ‘nature’ is extremely challenging and 
complex. This concept is by no means easy to define and because of the scope of this 
thesis, in no means do I aim to represent the full philosophical debate surrounding the 
concept of ‘nature’ and therefore, am not aiming to answer definitively how to define 
the concept of ‘nature’. I will lastly put forth my own view of ecological restoration, by 
re-evaluating and redefining the concept and analysing the following ethical 
implications. When analysing ecological restoration in chapter five I will be referring to 
Eric Higgs’ book Nature by Design (2003), as it includes a careful analysis of 
ecological restoration in a both philosophical and ecological sense. In addition, as a 
restoration ecologist, Higgs is able to contribute a more practical approach to the debate 
having hands-on experience of the restoration field. This adds a valuable dimension to 
the debate that is, within philosophy, often solely conducted on a conceptual level. I will 
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then test my definition of restoration against several problems faced by the topic. 
Throughout the thesis I will be using the terms ecological restoration and restoration 
interchangeably. 
1.1. What is ecological restoration? 
Now that I have outlined how ecological restoration is not only an intersection of the 
environmental debate but also an important area of environmental philosophy, it is 
important to look at how the concept has been defined. The Society for Ecological 
Restoration (SER) has defined ecological restoration throughout the years as follows; 
 1990: “Ecological restoration is the process of intentionally altering a site to establish a defined, 
indigenous, historic ecosystem. The goal of this process is to emulate the structure, function, diversity, 
and dynamics of the specified ecosystem.” 
1996: “Ecological restoration is the process of assisting the recovery and management of ecological 
integrity. Ecological integrity includes a critical range of variability in biodiversity, ecological processes 
and structures, regional and historical context, and sustainable cultural practices.” 
2002: “Ecological restoration is the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been 
degraded, damaged, or destroyed.” (Light 2009, 150; Higgs 2003, 107-110.) 
Looking at these definitions, it becomes apparent how problematic it is to define a 
concept as complex as ecological restoration. A clear sign of this complexity is the fact 
that SER has felt the need to redefine the concept two times since 1990. Looking at 
these definitions it is clear that the definition becomes more basic as time goes by. Why 
is this? Is it because when ecological restoration was first developed it had to be defined 
very clearly due to its novelty? Or is it because over time restoration practitioners have 
developed a better understanding of the discipline and therefore a simpler and a broader 
concept will do? Light has pointed out that the first two definitions contain “contentious 
categories” such as “indigenous” and “ecological integrity” (Light 2009, 150). One 
would need to give clarifying definitions for these concepts as well; in order to avoid 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations.  
Looking at the current definition put forth in 2002, this definition seems to be too 
general and therefore, might not be able to do justice to the complexity of the concept. 
Higgs admits that this definition has been deliberately kept broad in order to include 
various different types of restoration within its scope. The challenge is to find a concept 
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clear enough to identify core characteristics and to guide good restoration practice, but 
simultaneously broad enough to retain a variety of restoration projects targeted at 
myriad of different ecosystems that cover the face of the planet. (Higgs 2003, 109-110.) 
There are two important points to be made here. Firstly, ecological restoration is 
“intentional activity”.2 Restoration requires a choice; the restorationist takes an active 
role in choosing to restore a damaged area. Secondly, the act of restoration does not 
only aim to improve the state of a damaged area but to restore it to its previous 
condition (Higgs 2003, 119, 270). Ecological restoration takes in consideration the role 
of humans as the cause of the environmental problems, the active role of humans in the 
restoration work and the historical legacy of the natural areas. However, some have 
argued that ecological restoration should also aim at; 
returning a site to some previous state, with the species richness and diversity and physical, biological, 
and aesthetic characteristics of that site before human settlement and the accompanying disturbances 
(Morrison 1987, 160).  
To set the scene for more careful analysis of restoration I shall briefly mention two 
values that frequently arise in contemporary restoration work. Firstly, restoration 
projects tend to be looking into the past, looking into how the ecosystems worked prior 
to human intervention. Secondly restoration “places a high value on naturalness” which 
is often understood as “natural balance”. (Bratton 1992, 59.) However, Bratton adds that 
“these values are also limiting. They create a dichotomy not only between “natural” and 
“human” but also between “natural” and “new”.” (Bratton 1992, 60.) These dichotomies 
might have a limiting effect on restoration because they might not allow for the 
exploration of new or potentially better techniques to solve environmental problems. 
We need to acknowledge the limitations of restoration. For instance, if we find out that 
“a specific orchid was present before the critical perturbation does not mean that the 
species would have remained at the site for the next fifty years if that perturbation had 
not occurred”. (Bratton 1992, 60.) In fact, this type of obedience to the past that is 
characteristic to restoration often leads to holding nature as static, which does not reflect 
scientific and ecological research. 
                                                            
2 The idea of “intentional activity” is especially apparent in the title of Higgs’ book “Nature by Design”. 
Higgs argues that design is a necessary part of restoration activity. However, design can be thorny 
concept because it is principally human centred. (Higgs 2003, 270-276.) 
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2. Philosophical issues with restoration 
It might not come as a surprise that there are several philosophical issues with 
restoration. William Throop identifies four philosophical issues with restoration in his 
book Environmental Restoration: Ethics, Theory and Practice (2000), which I intend to 
use here as a roadmap through the quagmire of philosophical issues with restoration. In 
order to understand the philosophical debate surrounding restoration these issues require 
attention. Firstly, what goals should be driving restoration projects? Secondly, what 
should be the motivating values behind restoration? Thirdly, what means are 
appropriate to reach the goals? Finally, what kind of “overall attitude” should one have 
with regard to restoration? (Throop 2000, 13.) These are important issues and my aim is 
to investigate restoration with these four questions in mind. Let us have a closer look at 
what these issues entail. 
2.1. Goals 
Goals concentrate on the product of restoration and answer the question – ‘what should 
the end-product of restoration be like’? It is essential to spend some time investigating 
the goals of restoration, as restoration is often defined in terms of its goals. A difficult 
but necessary task is to clarify what kind of state should we be aiming for? Should we 
aim at a pre-disturbance structure or does a healthy structure suffice? If we are aiming 
to restore the pre-disturbance structure, how far into the past should we travel to find 
our reference design? Would it be just before the negative human intervention or should 
we go further back in history? Should we aim for reinhabitation which involves 
integrating humans sustainably into a renewed landscape (Throop 2000, 13)? These are 
difficult but important issues that require attention.  
If we are taking the pre-disturbance structure as our goal when restoring damaged 
environments we are straight away faced with empirical and normative problems. 
Starting with the empirical problems, it is an extremely difficult task, if not even in 
some cases an impossible task, to know what the environment was like before the 
human intervention. Often the areas in need of restoration have been influenced by 
human activity for hundreds of years and there might not exist an untouched 
environment similar to the one that is being restored that could be used as reference. 
(Throop 2000, 14.) In addition, even if we did manage to find a suitable model, we are 
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faced by an epistemic problem – ‘to which point in time should we aim to restore and 
how do we make this judgement?’ We must remember that ecosystems are constantly 
changing and in some cases going back in time might just be impossible.  
After all, ecology is a young science and there are still many fundamental questions 
about ecological systems that remain unanswered (Commoner 1971, 32). We must 
acknowledge that we might not know enough;  
Few of us in the scientific community are well prepared to deal with this degree of complexity. We have 
been trained by modern science to think about events that are vastly more simple – how one particle 
bounces off another, or how molecule A reacts with molecule B. Confronted by a situation as complex as 
the environment and its vast array of living inhabitants, we are likely – some more than others – to 
attempt to reduce it in our minds to a set of separate, simple events, in the hope that their sum will 
somehow picture the whole. The existence of the environmental crises warns us that this is an illusory 
hope. (Commoner 1971, 21.) 
As restoration is closely tied to ecology and ecological understanding, the problems that 
face ecology also face restoration. Ecology is extremely complex science as “it has 
particular subtlety and complexity, in part because ecology is peculiarly confronted by 
‘uniqueness’: millions of different species, countless billions of genetically distinct 
individuals, all living and interacting in a varied and ever-changing world” (Begon, 
Howarth, Townsend 2008, 6). For the sake of an argument let us assume that it is 
possible to discover the pre-disturbance structure of the damaged area we are aiming to 
restore. We are immediately faced by another problem. Even if we did have a clear goal 
for our restoration project it might not be technologically possible to restore the area 
(Elliot 1997, 77). We might not have the suitable equipment or scientific know-how to 
restore the damaged area to its pre-disturbance state. What makes goal setting for 
restoration even more challenging is that nature does not have a plan. Even if nature had 
a plan, how would we be able to find out what the plan is? The closest to a plan that 
nature appears to have is a pattern of “whatever works” (Throop 2000, 15). If nature 
does not have a plan or a formula that can be followed, how do we know that the goals 
that we have set are consistent with nature’s “goals”? 
Another issue regarding the goals of restoration deals with how the concept of 
“restoration” should be understood in general. Ecological restoration can occur in 
different forms. For instance John Cairns has managed to classify eight classes of 
restoration. Indeed, it seems that restoration can take different forms such as 
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rehabilitation, mitigation, regeneration, revegetation and reclamation to name a few. 
(Throop 2000, 13-14; Higgs 2003, 99-101.) However, I will look at these different kind 
of restorations more closely in the means section. To add to the empirical problems 
there are some metaphysical and evaluative problems that demand answers before 
restoration projects can be justified. Why should we aim for a particular state over 
another? For example, why should a pre-disturbance structure be preferred over a new 
healthier structure? (Throop 2000, 14.) 
2.2. Values 
Should restoration goals be based on values? The issue of values aims to answer the 
question – ‘why are we restoring a damaged environment?’ Since restoration is an 
activity which specifically aims to bring back an earlier condition, there must be 
something within that earlier condition that has value and is worth bringing back. In 
environmental philosophy literature, values are based in the core of restoration activity. 
Values give justification to a restoration project, determine which goals are acceptable 
and provide the practitioners with guidance on what means are appropriate. Therefore, it 
is important to analyse the values that motivate and justify restoration goals in general 
(Throop 2000, 13). For instance, in the case of pre-disturbance structure, the point of 
aiming for a pre-disturbance structure over other options should be justifiable by the 
values that lie within the pre-disturbance structure. A restoration project might aim for a 
structure prior to human intervention because special value is given to naturally evolved 
systems that have not been influenced by humans. The autonomy, wildness and 
independence embodied by the pre-disturbance structure could be valued. So, values 
provide guidance and should play a vital role when choosing a certain goal over 
another.   
One widely held value behind a pre-disturbance structure is wildness. According to this 
view, wildness has special value and because pre-disturbance structure exhibits 
wildness it is therefore more valuable than a damaged state. Restoration promises to 
recover the lost wildness. However, there is a paradox with the claim of restored 
wildness. Wildness is a state opposite to control – how can restoration, which involves 
human control, enhance wildness? (Throop 2000, 15.) 
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What makes restoration debate even more challenging is that it does not stay inside our 
normal ideas of value, such as how telling the truth or taking care of other people has 
moral value. The possible sources of value found in nature are sentience, consciousness, 
self-consciousness, being alive, ability to flourish, beauty, diversity, richness, 
complexity, harmony, stability and naturalness. Looking at this list it seems that value 
can occur in different levels which make environmental philosophy and the topic of 
restoration so difficult. Things can have value from rocks to lakes to entire ecosystems. 
One of the central issues within the debate of restoration is whether the value found in 
nature is of intrinsic or instrumental value? Intrinsic value is the type of value that a 
certain object (abstract or physical) has in itself or for its own sake. Intrinsic value is 
objective and does not depend on anything else. Instrumental value on the other hand is 
not valuable for its own sake, but is valuable because it is the means to some desired or 
required end. An object or an abstract entity can have instrumental value. For instance, 
water can have instrumental value for humans and for other species, since it offers 
hydration and keeps them alive. 
If nature is considered to be intrinsically valuable it does raise an important question: do 
the effects and the changes that humans make in the world have different value 
compared to changes that occur naturally? This question raises the problem of a nature-
human dichotomy, which has divided environmental philosophers into two separate 
camps. The opponents of the dichotomy claim that everything is natural, including 
humans and their actions. The advocates of the dichotomy claim that there is something 
inherently different about humans compared to other species. This inherent difference 
separates humans from nature and can be detrimental to its intrinsic value. I shall come 
back to this issue throughout my thesis as I believe that this dichotomy is ultimately 
behind the confusion in defining of ecological restoration.   
2.3. Means 
Means deal with the process of restoration – ‘how should the goals be achieved’? 
According to Throop, the appropriate means for restoration have not really received 
much attention from philosophers (Throop 2000, 17). The appropriate means not 
receiving much attention appears peculiar as I see means serving as one of the key 
aspects of restoration. I believe that the means have a central role in determining how 
detrimental the restoration was for the natural values found in nature. For instance, if 
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one believes nature to be intrinsically valuable, the values would likely demand to use 
the pre-disturbance structure as a restoration goal and would further require that human 
impact should be kept to a minimum, ruling out invasive and intrusive means. This 
would restrict the appropriate means to minimal human agency by highlighting 
restoration practices that allow the area to heal itself by using natural means such as fire 
instead of machines (Throop 2000, 17.) 
One of the controversial issues with means deals with the death of organisms. Often 
restoration projects involve destructive practices towards some of the organisms in the 
ecosystem. These practices can be direct or indirect. For example, introducing a 
predator will indirectly cause death to the species it preys on. The issue with death is 
especially troublesome with sentient species. Throop uses an example of feral goats 
living on San Clemente Island. These goats “are live-trapped at great expense. Others 
are shot, at less expense, to restore the island’s ecosystems and to protect three 
endangered species of plants” (Throop 2000, 17). Death of individual organisms raises 
the issue of trade-offs. What would be the appropriate trade-off between goats and 
endangered plants? How rare does a plant species need to be to justify killing of a goat? 
Should sentience play a role? Can we even make such judgements as nature does not? 
Exotic species serves an example of direct eliminating. Exotic species are often 
“defined as species that have been introduced to an environment by humans”. This 
raises the question of why the introduction via humans different from species migration. 
The issue with exotic species is that they often dramatically alter their environments and 
endanger indigenous species. (Throop 2000, 17.) Exotic species also raise an important 
question in why should we remove a perfectly good species that thrives in an area only 
because it was introduced by humans? 
I believe many philosophers and people objecting to restoration projects are often 
objecting the means by which they are executed. If we only look at the question of 
whether restoration should be allowed then we are considering all the possible different 
ways of restoring nature which can be overwhelming and will most likely obscure the 
issue at hand. Means should be part of the debate from a very early stage. It should be 
clear that not all means are necessarily acceptable. After all, restoration is ultimately 
about action. 
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2.4. Overall attitude 
There is large array of overall attitudes towards restoration ranging from joyfully 
optimistic to shocked and pessimistic. The pessimistic side is mainly composed of the 
advocates of nature-human dichotomy and the optimistic tend to view this dichotomy as 
deceptive and misleading. In the next chapter I will be presenting the arguments of 
Robert Elliot, Eric Katz and Andrew Light. Even though they are ultimately debating 
what value exists in nature and what value exists in restored nature, based on this 
argumentation they are making conclusions regarding the overall attitude towards 
restored nature. Their arguments regarding the value that exists in nature will feed into 
the overall attitude of restoration. I will argue that goals, values and means should all 
feed into the overall attitude towards ecological restoration. In chapter five I am aiming 
to assess and provide a definition for ecological restoration.  
3. The current debate concerning ecological restoration 
Now that I have identified important concepts and aspects of ecological restoration, we 
can take a proper look into the debate. In this section I will attempt to show what kind 
of debate has surrounded the restoration topic. For this purpose I have chosen three 
environmental philosophers Robert Elliot, Erik Katz and Andrew Light to represent the 
broad spectrum of views toward restoration. I have chosen Elliot as he started the debate 
with his acclaimed article “Faking Nature” (1982), which sparked off a lively debate as 
to whether ecological restoration is able restore all the values of damaged ecosystems. I 
chose Katz as he has also contributed greatly towards the debate and offers a very 
radical and sceptical point of view. In fact, Robert Elliot and Erick Katz are reoccurring 
names throughout restoration literature. Light recognises this by stating that “the most 
influential work by environmental philosophers on this topic, surely that of Robert 
Elliot and Eric Katz…” (Light 2009, 147).  The reason I have chosen Andrew Light is 
that he is one of the key contributors to the debate. In addition, he offers a different, 
more positive approach, towards human involvement in restoration which allows me to 
present a more balanced discussion on the topic. 
3.1. Faking nature - Robert Elliot 
Robert Elliot pioneered the restoration debate with his seminal article ‘Faking Nature’ 
in the beginning of the eighties. In this article Elliot attacks the proposals often made to 
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avoid the arguments of environmentalists in order to exploit the natural resources of 
natural areas. He calls the arguments used to support this exploitation “the restoration 
thesis”. (Elliot 1982, 381.) He defines the restoration thesis as destroying something 
which can be admitted to have value and then compensating for this loss of value by 
recreating something of equal value to the original (Elliot 1982, 381).
3
 An example of 
the restoration thesis could be seen as a shale gas company discovering big reserves of 
shale gas in a natural area and justifying the degradation of the area with a promise of 
ecological restoration – claiming that the natural values that are lost is only temporary 
as restoration is able to bring these values back. Indeed after the shale gas has been 
extracted the company commits itself to restoring the area to its former glory, case 
closed. “Not quite,” Elliot would say as the matter is not quite this simple. Even if the 
shale gas company was able to restore the area perfectly, so that not even the best 
ecologists or biologists could tell the difference between a natural and the restored area. 
Even then, according to Elliot, something would be missing. There is something special 
in the natural areas that simply cannot be restored. (Elliot 1982, 381-388.) Elliot points 
out that these types of proposals are common in the current world and it is therefore 
important to address them. Many of the restoration proposals do not hold 
conservationist principles but are used as means to undermine the arguments of 
conservationists and environmentalists. (Elliot 1982, 381.) He claims that there is a 
“rational, coherent ethical system which supports decisive objections to the restoration 
thesis” (Elliot 1982, 382). In addition, this ethical system has normative appeal (Elliot 
1982, 382).   
Elliot argues that the reason why restoration policies are unable to fully restore value 
where it has been lost, is because we value the ‘naturalness’ of environments and the 
reason they have value “is because they are natural to a high degree” (Elliot 1982, 383). 
Elliot defines natural as “unmodified by human activity” (Elliot 1982, 383). He argues 
that the origin of a natural thing and the course of action which brought it into being 
determine the value of that thing. In other words, this value is “a special kind of 
continuity with the past”. (Elliot 1982, 384.) Elliot points out that the arguments 
underlying the restoration thesis do not take in consideration the temporal and spatial 
                                                            
3 Elliot identifies that the essential goal of the restoration thesis (in Faking Nature he calls it ‘replacement 
thesis’) is to recreate the exact same ecosystem that existed before the disturbance, that is, to recreate all 
the properties that were present in the original ecosystem. Consequently, according to the restoration 
thesis, the values found in natural ecosystems lie within its attributes which it assumes can be recreated 
and replicated. (Elliot 1997, 79-80.) 
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elements involved. The arguments supporting the restoration thesis only concentrate on 
the things in themselves, such as specific type of species, and do not concentrate in the 
way these species came about. (Elliot 1982, 383.) Indeed, Elliot claims that this 
temporal aspect of the natural area is extremely important and should play a role in our 
evaluations of natural areas. What Elliot is trying to emphasise is the importance of 
origin and how the origin of a place can play a vital role in our evaluation of it. Quite 
often our evaluations of nature are directly dependent on the area’s origin. (Elliot 1982, 
383-384.) If the area has a history of heavy human intervention, the place cannot 
continue to be “natural” in our eyes. It seems that the alleged natural area, the object of 
our evaluation, must have “a special kind of continuity with the past” and human 
intervention appears to break this continuity. (Elliot 1982, 384.)  
Elliot elucidates his argument by emphasising the importance of origin with three 
examples. All three examples are aimed to illustrate in different ways how origin does 
matter. In his first example he asks the reader to imagine a beautiful sculpture in his 
garden that is too fragile to move. Unfortunately the local council happens to have a 
commission to fit sewage pipes just underneath the fragile sculpture. Realising the 
damage caused to the sculpture due to the sewage works, the council promises to 
replace the sculpture with an exact replica. (Elliot 1982, 383.) Even a less perceptive 
reader will notice that the replica fails to compensate for all the values lost in the 
destruction of the original sculpture. Although the replica might very well be better than 
nothing at all, it does not fully compensate for the value that is lost. In his second 
example he illustrates the restoration-natural distinction by comparing an original work 
of art to a fake or forgery. In the same way as the history and genesis of a famous 
painting affects its value, history and genesis has the same effect on the value of nature. 
(Elliot 1982, 183-184.) To illustrate his argument let us use the painting of Mona Lisa 
as an example to demonstrate that genesis does matter. The fact that it has been painted 
by Leonardo da Vinci himself, with the specific artistic styles and brushstrokes that he 
chose to make, in the political and cultural environment, all adds up to the value of the 
painting. If we found out that the painting we specifically went to see in Louvre was not 
Mona Lisa, but an exact replica, we would be disappointed and we would not value the 
replica nearly as much as the original. In the same way, as the exact replica of the Mona 
Lisa being a fake, so is a restored landscape. It might look identical to other natural 
landscapes, but the fact that the appropriate continuity with the past has been disturbed, 
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by having a human cause instead of a natural cause, causes it to lack value, like a fake 
Mona Lisa. (Elliot 1982, 383-385.)  
By using these analogies with art, Elliot aims to show that in the same way as history 
and genesis matters in art it also matters in nature. He aims to show this by examples of 
faking nature. He goes on to illustrate his point by employing three different scenarios 
where John who enthusiastically values wilderness finds himself deceived by areas that 
he believes are real wilderness, but in fact are not. The first example includes Nozik’s 
experience machine. John has been abducted by a “utilitarian-minded super 
technologist” who has created an experience machine which can mimic any type of 
experience that will feel as real as the real thing. The super technologist is aware of 
John’s passion towards genuine wilderness and decides to make John experience “real” 
wilderness. This is just an experience brought about by the machine and has nothing to 
do with reality. In the second example John is taken to an area that looks just like real 
wilderness but has been made completely out of plastic. In the third example, John sees 
a beautiful forest that looks just like a forest untouched by humans. However, John is 
unaware that a thousand years ago the forest was completely destroyed by strip-mining, 
but the area had regenerated itself afterwards. What all of these examples aim to show is 
that the history and genesis matter and the knowledge of this history will completely 
alter John’s perceptions of these experiences. Even though these examples display 
differing degrees of value – the third example clearly has more value compared to the 
first one – the main point is that all of these examples could have more value and what 
affects this value is the “causal genesis” of these areas or experiences. (Elliot 1982, 385-
386.)  
For Elliot, important determinants of nature’s value are its freedom of human dominion 
and its independence (Elliot 1982, 384). Nevertheless, it is important to point out that 
Elliot is not arguing that everything that is natural must be valuable. His aim is not to 
make the claim that everything that is natural is automatically valuable. For instance, he 
does not claim that diseases, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions are necessarily good 
(Elliot 1982, 383-384; Elliot 1997, 116-149). The main line of his argument is that “the 
environmentalist’s complaint concerning restoration proposals is that nature is not 
replaceable without depreciation in one aspect of its value which has to do with its 
genesis, its history” (Elliot 1982, 381). 
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However, Elliot reminds that valuing nature is not only about aesthetic appreciation. 
Aesthetic appreciation can be part of it but is not the fundamentally important aspect of 
our evaluation of nature. There must also be a judgemental element, without it there 
would be no rational arguments for valuing nature more than faked “natural” areas. 
Knowledge plays an important part of the judgemental element. It is knowledge that 
guides us when we evaluate whether an alleged wilderness area is genuinely wilderness 
or skilfully created replica. With greater knowledge we are able to evaluate the 
genuineness of natural areas. Elliot admits that he might not be able to tell apart a 
wilderness area and a restored natural area, but he can learn to do so. In addition, 
knowledge has the potential to create new values. According to Elliot, the more we 
learn about nature and how complex and interconnected it is, the more likely our 
evaluation of it will increase and we might even learn to value it in new ways. (Elliot 
1982, 386-387.) According to Elliot, “[u]nderstanding and evaluation go hand in hand” 
(Elliot1982, 387.) In fact evaluation and knowledge are able show that natural values 
are worth preserving. Elliot’s main point is that what humans can never mimic or 
restore is an area’s history. Whenever an area is restored it will always leave a mark that 
will be there affecting its value, even if the restoration went unnoticed.   
In Faking Nature (1997) Elliot goes into a more detailed analysis of restoration.
4
 Elliot 
also softens his view on restoration. He still argues that there are fundamental issues 
with restoration, but does not take a black and white view on the products of restoration. 
Elliot argues that the goal of the restoration thesis is unwarranted due to the 
misunderstanding over the values found in nature. According to Elliot, the restoration 
thesis concentrates mistakenly only on the intrinsic properties found in nature however, 
this analysis neglects the ‘relational properties’ that are missing in the restored 
ecosystem. Relational properties arise from the relationship a particular thing(s) has to 
“objects and events outside or beyond themselves, that differentiate them” (Elliot 1997, 
80). Relational properties point out the historical differences of places and therefore, 
they are important determinants of value in natural areas. I will assume for the sake of 
the argument that we are able to restore a former mining site back to its exact original 
condition. If these two states (prior to restoration state and after the restoration state) 
were compared they would appear to be identical in their intrinsic properties. Both 
                                                            
4 Elliot calls restoration thesis replacement thesis in Faking Nature. I shall continue to call it restoration 
thesis to avoid confusion (Elliot 1997, 76).   
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states would contain varieties of different species, beauty and biodiversity. However, a 
relational property is able to reveal that these intrinsic properties have come about in 
very different ways. In the original ecosystem, the properties had evolved naturally and 
in the restored ecosystem the properties were created by humans. Relational properties 
are, according to Elliot, important bases for values and can also act as value-adding.
5
  
According to Elliot, the restoration thesis “is flawed because it incorrectly assumes that 
the factual differences, upon which the value differences supervene, are all revealed by 
a snapshot” (Elliot 1997, 80). In short, Elliot argues that the goals of restoration, that is, 
the replication of nature, is unwarranted because there are certain properties that resist 
replication or are not evident if relational properties such as history are left out of 
considerations.  
As I mentioned earlier, it is interesting how Elliot changes and softens his views about 
restoration in Faking Nature. He even admits that “[g]iven enough time, close to 
original value might be restored. Still it makes sense to endorse the extreme view and to 
say that the passage of time does not restore full value because there is always 
something missing which is irreplaceable” (Elliot 1997, 91). Fast recovery of natural 
values can override Elliot’s claim that nature’s development through natural forces is 
more value-adding compared to human created environments encompassing the same 
ecological complexity (Elliot 1997, 93). Elliot concedes that natural forces which 
eventually take over, will slowly diminish the negative impact of human intervention. 
After all, naturalness occurs in degrees – nature is able to restore itself to a degree. “So 
the distinction between the natural and the non-natural is not a sharp distinction: rather 
the contrasting concepts mark out opposite ends of a continuum.” (Elliot 1997, 82.) 
3.2. The big lie – Eric Katz 
Eric Katz is a clear case of a nature-culture dualist. He makes a clear ontological 
separation between humans and nature (Light 2000, 403). He discusses restoration in 
his controversially named article ‘The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature’ (Katz 
1992). Even though Elliot’s environmental views have affected Katz, he takes an even 
more pessimistic approach to restoration. Katz has noticed how the idea that humanity 
is “able” to and therefore “should” restore nature has emerged as a key element in 
                                                            
5 Value-adding properties are properties that increase the value of the thing that possess these properties 
(Elliot 1997, 10, 87-9). For instance natural continuity is a value adding property, according to Elliot 
(Elliot 1997, 92). There can also be value subtracting properties (Elliot 1997, 87-89). 
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environmental politics. According to Katz, the idea that humans have the duty to restore 
natural areas they have damaged or destroyed is at best an optimistic illusion. (Katz 
1992, 390-391.) This sudden emergence of environmental ethics and environmental 
policy is founded on “misperception of natural reality and a misguided understanding of 
the human place in the natural environment” (Katz 1992, 391). He argues that humanity 
does not have an obligation or the ability to repair the damage it has done to nature, and 
so he radically questions the purpose of restoration. He argues that on a deeper level, 
restoration is mere expression of anthropocentrism
6
 and the human aspiration to ‘re-
create’ nature to fit human needs. According to Katz, restoration is “on the most 
fundamental level [...] an unrecognized manifestation of the insidious dream of the 
human domination of nature”. (Katz 1992, 391.) 
Katz also uses analogies to illustrate his point more clearly. Instead of arguing that 
restored nature is fake like Elliot did, Katz argues that restored nature is like an artefact. 
He uses the analogy of an artefact because the word indicates that human intervention 
has been involved, since artefacts are fundamentally anthropocentric. He clarifies that 
artefacts always have some foreseeable purpose because otherwise they would not have 
been created. Katz writes that artefacts are “created for human use, human purpose – 
they serve a function for human life.” (Katz 1992, 392.) Once humanity begins to pose 
their anthropocentric expediencies on nature, the once natural areas that have been 
restored lose their naturalness, even though they might appear natural. According to 
Katz, by restoring nature, humanity displays its arrogance and denies nature of its 
autonomy. When an area has been restored it becomes a human artefact. It is important 
to point out that Katz defines ‘nature’ in the same way as Elliot does as “independent of 
the actions of humanity”. (Katz 1992, 395-392.)   
For Katz, the concept of an ‘artefact’ is closely tied to the concepts of function and 
purpose. Katz accepts the Aristotelian view according to which artefacts do not have 
“inner nature or hidden essence that can be discovered”. (Katz 1992, 392.) Katz uses 
Michel Losonsky’s definition of artefacts in his article. According to Losonsky, 
artefacts have a nature which is made up of three characteristics: “internal structure, 
                                                            
6 According to anthropocentrism, humans are the centre of all values. The location of intrinsic values 
resides in the human species. Humans create values and a world without humans would be a world devoid 
of values. In contrast, according to biocentrism, values do not have to originate from human beings. Non-
human species and ecosystems can also have intrinsic value. Humans are able to recognise this value, yet 
this value continues to exist even without the human species. This dichotomy enables the heated debate 
within environmental ethics. 
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purpose, and manner of use” (Katz 1992, 392). These three characteristics govern to a 
degree the changes that an artefact would go through. For instance, “[c]locks would not 
develop in a manner which prevented the measurement of time”. (Katz 1992, 392.) In 
comparison to artefacts, “natural objects lack the kind of purpose and function found in 
artifacts” (Katz 1992, 392). This is because natural objects have not been designed or 
created to serve a certain purpose. Katz points out that despite the fact that natural 
objects do not have a function or purpose, this type of language is being used especially 
in science explaining the roles of different species within an ecosystem. This type of 
language may be misleading and give an impression that certain species, for example, 
have emerged to fill a certain role and a function, even though this is not the case and 
thus such language must either be “metaphorical or fallacious”. (Katz 1992, 392.) 
Another important and distinctive feature of artefacts is that they are anthropocentric. 
Restoration is inevitably the moulding and designing of environments by imposing 
human plans and purposes on the area. (Katz 1992, 392.)  
 
Katz agrees that the analogy between nature and art is a powerful one, but criticises 
Elliot in that the example of a painting is too individualistic and static to work as a 
proper analogy for nature. Instead, Katz proposes an analogy of art composed by a 
dynamic community, which is passed on for future generations, changing slightly every 
time.
7
 He uses an example of classical ballet, where every performance is unique even 
though the ballet remains the same. In fact, Katz remarks that using human artefacts as 
analogies compared with nature will further enhance the anthropocentric view. Finally 
Katz warns us: “[o]nce we dominate nature, once we restore and redesign nature for our 
own purposes, then we have destroyed nature – we have created an artifactual reality, in 
a sense, a false reality, which merely provides us the pleasant illusory appearance of the 
natural environment.” (Katz 1992, 395-396.) 
 
Looking at Katz’s argumentation with regard to restoration there are actually two 
distinguishable questions at play here: “(1) Do we have an obligation to try to restore 
damaged nature? and (2) Do we have the ability to restore damaged nature?” (Light 
2000, 402.) Katz’s answer to the second question is that humans do not have the ability 
to restore nature. For Katz, restoration is impossible. When humans aim to restore 
                                                            
7 An example proposed by L. B. Cebik in “Forging Issues from Forged Art” (see Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 27 (1989), 331-46). 
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nature the outcome will inevitably be an artefact, not nature, rendering restoration 
impossible. Consequently, if one cannot restore nature one cannot have the obligation to 
do so. (Light 2000, 402.) It would be illogical for someone to be obliged to do 
something that would simply be impossible for them to do. This argument is closely 
related to Immanuel Kant’s “ought implies can”. If someone ought to do something they 
need to be able to do that thing. 
3.3. Restoring the human-nature relationship – Andrew Light 
Light presents a more optimistic approach to the restoration debate. According to Light, 
most environmental philosophers do not properly understand the theoretical and 
practical importance of ecological restoration. Such failure could be a cause of mistaken 
impression of the concept of ecological restoration. He points out that ecological 
restoration is not just the attempt to restore nature, but also an attempt to restore the 
human relationship with nature. (Light 2000, 398-400.)  
One of Light’s aims is to convert environmental philosophy into a more pragmatic 
discipline.
8
 He distinguishes between two categories of ecological restoration; malicious 
and benevolent restoration. These two types of restoration result in different moral 
conclusions. Malicious restoration is a type of restoration that would be similar to 
Elliot’s “restoration thesis”, where restoration is being used as the justification of 
causing environmental damage. Benevolent restoration, on the other hand, is a type of 
restoration that aims to restore already damaged areas, but does not use it as a 
justification for the exploitation of nature. Benevolent restoration is about doing the 
right thing and creating a new relationship with nature. By making this distinction 
between different types of restoration, Elliot’s “restoration thesis” only applies to 
malicious restoration. Even though there are restoration projects that fall into the 
category of malicious restoration, it does not mean that all restoration projects are used 
to justify environmental exploitation. In fact, there are many restoration projects that 
arise from the realisation of the past misuse of environments which aim to repair this 
damage without any direct economic benefits motivating the restoration project. (Light 
2000, 401.)    
                                                            
8 The view that Light aims to develop is called “environmental pragmatism”. Environmental pragmatism 
is agnostic about the existence of intrinsic value in nature. Environmental pragmatism forces the 
discussion outside philosophy papers and university corridors. The point is to include the public and 
practitioners in the discussions. (Light 2000, 400.) 
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Light agrees that Elliot’s art analogy is convincing, however, Light thinks that a better 
analogy would be achieved by “pushing the art analogy even further” (Light 2000, 401). 
He suggests that instead of depicting restoration as faking art, it should be depicted as 
repairing a damaged piece of art. According to Light, as natural beings living in the 
world we inevitably have a relationship with it, even when separable from it. Helping 
nature in the form of restoration is beneficial to our moral character, in the same way as 
it is beneficial to help other human beings. He goes on to consider what kind of 
relationship could exist between humans and nature. He aims to elucidate this 
relationship by using an estranged brother analogy, which is aimed to illuminate that 
our relationship with nature has “moral content of its own... that is independent of the 
fulfillment of any obligations”. (Light 2000, 406.) In the example he asks us to imagine 
that he has a distant brother. Because Light is related to his brother, he feels that he has 
obligations towards him, such as to respect his autonomy and integrity and therefore 
avoiding causing him harm. However, because this relationship is unsubstantial Light 
feels that he does not have a normative relationship with his brother, as he does with his 
close friends and feels that this sort of positive value that exists with his relationships 
with his friend is missing. If, for instance, he did not talk to his brother for a long time, 
he would not feel that his relationship would suffer from it in a normative way, as this 
aspect is missing. What the estranged brother analogy aims to show is that one can have 
a relationship with another involving obligation or duty but lack positive value that 
demands upkeep. A normative relationship can have both positive and negative value. If 
Light decided to lie to his friend their normative relationship would suffer, presenting 
negative value. What if Light then decides to build this normative relationship with his 
estranged brother, what steps should he take? Light argues that the way to improve such 
a non-existent normative relationship is to participate in his life. In the similar way as 
we can get close to an estranged brother, we can get closer to nature and improve our 
relationship with it. Indeed, Light thinks that restoration entails that we must form such 
a normative relationship with nature. (Light 2000, 406-407.)  
The point that Light is making is that benevolent restoration has the potential to create 
new values, “there can be some kind of positive value to our interaction with nature, 
then doing right by nature will have the same reciprocal effect of morally implicating us 
in a positive value as occurs when we do right by other persons” (Light 2000, 406). 
These potential values can make restoration a desirable candidate against doing nothing. 
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Even though restoration might not be able to restore all the values found in nature, such 
as its naturalness, it can bring about new values, which would make doing something 
better than doing nothing.  
Light identifies a weak point in Katz’s arguments. Katz gives a “very slim admission” 
that restoration projects can differ in the way they are executed. Katz himself does not 
give these differences much significance, however, by acknowledging that there are and 
can be different restoration projects presents the frailty in his argument and in turn 
offers Light the opportunity to attack Katz’s arguments. The frailty with Katz’s (and 
Elliot’s) arguments lies in the fact that the intention of ecological restoration is not to 
deceive anyone. Benevolent ecological restoration programmes do not fulfil the 
allegations put forth by Katz – that restoration is trying to duplicate or create new nature 
or that restoration project impose human arrogance on nature. (Light 2000, 402-403.)   
Light uses four arguments to guard against Katz’s critical view over human 
participation with nature. Firstly, Light argues that some cases, like with exotic species 
which often take over large areas and inhibit the flourishing of indigenous species, is a 
good case where the omission of humans would, in fact, not result in more autonomous 
nature, on the contrary, it seems that only active removal of the exotic species would 
allow the indigenous nature to pursue its own ends. Secondly, Light argues that even if 
we accepted Katz claim that humans cannot restore nature, it does not entail that 
humans should not attempt to restore some of the damage that has been done in the past. 
Light uses an illuminating counter example where restoration would indeed seem to 
benefit natural areas instead of inflicting it to more domination. Light asks us to imagine 
two separate wilderness preserves separated by a corridor between them that allows 
species to move freely between the two preserves. Restoring this wildlife corridor, for 
example by removing roads and buildings, would increase the autonomy and health of 
the two wilderness preserves as wildlife corridors help prevent isolation of species 
which can lead to reduced genetic diversity. This example appears to show that human 
interaction with nature can potentially enhance its freedom and self-sustainability. 
Thirdly, Light points out that Katz’s “sense of restoration confuses restoration with 
mitigation”, that is, restoration projects that are designed to conform to human needs. 
However, Light stresses that the goals of restoration are not determined by human 
preferences, but are determined by nature, that is, what scientific knowledge and history 
tells us about the ecology of the area one is aiming to restore. Fourthly, Light points out 
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that Katz’s claim, that restoration inhibits the self-realisation of nature, simply is not 
logically sound. He uses an example of a criminal and a victim where the criminal is 
forced by restitution to amend his erroneous past actions towards the victim. Even 
though the criminal might not succeed in fully compensating for the loss, we could not 
claim, according to Light, that the victims’ self-realisation has been damaged. (Light 
2000, 404-405.) 
Light’s makes an important point by showing that using a single category does not do 
the complicated topic of restoration justice. A distinction must be made between 
malicious and benevolent restoration projects. Also Light’s discovery of the potential 
relationship with nature is important. After all, we are inevitably connected to the 
ecosystems we live in. 
4. What is nature?  
As we saw in the previous chapter there are serious disagreements on how restoration 
should be understood and whether restoration should be practiced. These problems are 
scientific, pragmatic and philosophical in their nature. A fundamental issue with 
restoration appears to reside in the concept of “nature” – are we actually talking about 
the same thing?  For instance when Elliot, Katz and Light are arguing either for or 
against restoration, they appear to have differing views on what nature means. Katz 
appears to define nature as pristine wilderness, the autonomous forces of nature. Katz’s 
definition of nature appears to be the antonym to humans. Light on the other hand 
appears to define nature more broadly, something that does not necessarily exclude 
humans. Alternatively Elliot’s definition seems to fall somewhere in the middle. Elliot’s 
view is rather challenging as it allows nature to occur in degrees, but at the same time 
nature should be understood as something that is free from human action.
9
 In the end 
Elliot appears to advocate a view of nature that is more aligned to pristine wilderness, as 
naturalness is ultimately to do with the areas origin. This definitional problem appears 
to display itself in its full complexity once we discuss the topic of restoration. 
In this chapter I will look at different ways of defining the concept of “nature” and will 
aim to identify why it distorts the discussions surrounding restoration. I will also take a 
closer look at what is meant by “wilderness” as I believe that these two concepts are 
                                                            
9 In addition, Elliot softens in his view in Faking Nature in 1997.  
23 
 
fundamentally interlinked. I will aim to show that one of the reasons why so many 
philosophers disagree about restoration actually springs from the fact that they have 
different understandings of the concept of nature. They are not essentially talking about 
the same thing – they are not restoring the same nature. In order to resolve this issue, I 
will attempt to define the concept of nature more clearly or at least bring these issues to 
the surface, in the hope of avoiding such confusions in the future. It is important to 
point out that due to the scope of my thesis I am unable to fully cover and assess the full 
complexity of the debate surrounding the concept of nature.
10
 However, I hope I will be 
able bring some clarity to the concepts involved and hope to show why it causes 
problems in the debate surrounding restoration.  
4.1. The concept of “nature” 
The question of how to define the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘natural(ness)’ is the key 
question in environmental philosophy. When looking at any area or aspect of 
environmental philosophy it all comes down to the concept of ‘natural’. This is why I 
think it is diligent to look at the concept of ‘nature’ early on. The concepts of ‘nature’ 
and ‘natural’ are indeed extremely problematic and equivocal. This has been noticed by 
several philosophers. For instance Reed F. Noss stated the following; “I know of no 
philosophical problem more recalcitrant than the whole question of “what is natural?”” 
(Noss 1995, 445). 
When looking at the concept of ‘nature’, a natural place to begin would be John Stuart 
Mill’s influential essay ‘On Nature’. In the beginning of the essay Mill admits to the 
complications and challenges that are involved when analysing the word ‘nature’ and 
‘natural’. Because of these complications;  
[T]he words have thus become entangled in so many foreign associations, mostly of a very powerful and 
tenacious character, that they have come to excite, and to be the symbols of, feelings which their original 
meaning will by no means justify; and which have made them one of the most copious sources of false 
philosophy, false morality, and even bad law. (Mill 1874, 5.)   
Mill has given a compelling definition to what is meant by ‘nature’. He states that there 
are at least two different ways we can define the meaning of ‘nature’. The first way of 
                                                            
10 Michael Nelson and Baird Callicott have edited two extensive collections of articles on the 
philosophical debate surrounding the concept of ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’. See The Great New 
Wilderness Debate (1998) and The Wilderness Debate Rages On (2008).  
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defining ‘nature’ is as all the powers that exist in the world and all the things that are 
caused by these powers. Consequently, everything in the world is part of nature. The 
second way of understanding ‘nature’ is as all the things that fall outside human agency 
and human intervention. (Mill 1874, 6-7.) In other words, “[t]he first sense of the term 
signifies roughly what is ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘supernatural’. The second sense 
registers the contrast between the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’” (O’Neill, Holland, and 
Light 2008, 128). However, from the perspective of restoration, the first definition is not 
very fruitful. If we interpreted ‘nature’ according to Mill’s first definition destroying 
nature would be equally as natural as restoring it. No judgements could be made on the 
matter that would feed to the concept of “nature” and “naturalness”. In general most 
environmental philosophy would be interpreting nature according to the second 
definition. Mill’s second definition is more suitable when discussing ecological 
restoration as the definition allows us to make judgements on human agency (Attfield 
1994, 113). However, this poses a problem to the restoration debate, “[h]ow can 
anything be restored by human agency the essence of which is to be independent of 
human agency?” (Attfield 1994, 113).  
Mill himself had a negative view of nature. According to him, humans should not aim to 
replicate nature or to look at nature for inspiration. Even though Mill did not think it 
was desirable to have nature as the ideal model of things, he did think that nature had 
valuable aspects.  
He grasped the terror-inspiring vastness of natural forces, and to this he ascribed their sublimity; but he 
seems to have omitted the sense of nature’s otherness or strangeness, and the importance that this has in 
renewing both wonder and perspective (Attfield 1994, 114).  
It is important to remember that when Mill wrote ‘On Nature’ scientific knowledge was 
in its infancy and the complexity behind the ecosystems where unknown or explained 
away with stories, myths and religion. 
4.2. What is nature? Is it wilderness, countryside or home?
  
I shall understand the terms ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ as referring to the state of the world 
outside human domain (however, not necessarily excluding humans) to mean something 
that is opposite to what we consider artefacts. As part of the world that is studied by 
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biology and ecology. What exactly does nature entail is a difficult question. This 
problem has been described succinctly by O’Neill, Holland and Light:  
to picture nature as the world from which intentional human acts have been abstracted may seem unreal, 
given that intentional human agents are as much products of nature as are sunflowers and seahorses. This 
is a tension that indeed goes to the heart of our environmental predicament, and is a key challenge that 
any account of environmental value must recognise and meet. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 130-131.)  
Thus it is not always clear that people talk about the same nature. O’Neill et al. point 
out that when talking about nature, Europeans tend to refer to what is ‘rural’ and for the 
people living in the ‘new world’, ‘natural’ is understood in the sense of ‘wilderness’. 
The ‘rural’ here is understood as landscape that has been ‘cultivated’ and 
‘domesticated’. In a rural landscape the handprint of man is evident. ‘Wilderness’ on the 
other hand is an idea of a pristine landscape which is untouched by humans.
11
 (O’Neill 
et al. 2008, 132.)  
[W]e must be careful to preserve a distinction between this identification of nature with ‘wilderness’, 
understood as that which is free of all marks of human activity, and the notion of nature that contrasts 
simply with what is artificial (O’Neill et al. 2008, 132).  
In other words, it is important that the concept of nature as ‘wilderness’ and the contrast 
of nature in contrast to artificial be kept distinct. O’Neill et al. illustrate this point by 
indicating that albeit the landscape of Europe is almost entirely shaped by humans, it 
would be wrong to say that in the context of Europe one could not talk about nature, 
when nature is contrasted with artificial. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 132.) 
In order to clarify the concept of ‘nature’ as ‘wilderness’ we need to confirm what it 
really signifies “regardless of a person’s social and cultural background” (O’Neill et al. 
2008, 132). O’Neill et al. point out that depending on the persons social and cultural 
background people tend to have different views on what designates wilderness. For 
instance as noted before, Europeans tend to think that a rural landscape or the 
countryside is nature. People living in the new world tend to think that demarcated 
wilderness areas, such as National Parks, are “real” nature. However, in the case of 
many indigenous populations, such as Indians in America, do not regard wilderness 
areas as wilderness but as their home. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 132.) Indeed, when the 
explorers from Europe embarked on the voyages across the Atlantic Ocean and explored 
                                                            
11 Also see Higgs 2003, 93. 
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the American continent “this ‘original’ and ‘primitive’ was not a wilderness but a 
cultural landscape with its own history” (O’Neill et al. 2008, 133).  
4.3. The paradox of nature conservation and restoration 
When looking at nature conservation or nature restoration one is dealing with the value 
that can be found in nature. If a natural area is conserved, it is because there exists 
something of value that would otherwise be lost. In the case of restoration, the act of 
restoring and repairing the damage done to nature is being restored or repaired in the 
hopes that with the action the lost value will be restored. (O’Neill, Holland and Light 
2008, 138-39.) 
Interestingly there seems to be a metaphysical problem with ecological restoration. This 
problem appears to make ecological restoration and conservation paradoxical. It has 
been explained by O’Neill et al. like this; 
[N]ature, in the second of the two senses identified by Mill, is what exists outside of any intentional 
human intervention [...] restoration on the other hand, requires intentional human intervention in order to 
put it into effect. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 139.)  
In other words, restoration which is an act of intentional intervention would not actually 
be helping a natural area be more natural, but would instead be subjecting it to even 
more human intervention. However, it has been argued by several philosophers that the 
paradox of nature conservation “is more apparent than real” (O’Neill et al. 2008, 139; 
Elliot 1997, 124-125). For example, Robin Attfield has compared this with parenting 
methods, how agency and intervention of parents towards their children will later result 
in autonomy as the children grow up “though here autonomy is of course initiated rather 
than restored” (Attfield 1994, 117). Whether restoration or conservation of nature will 
be paradoxical depends on how nature is understood.   
4.4. The artificial and artefacts 
I will next take a closer look at artefacts. As I have established earlier the concept of an 
‘artefact’ is central when discussing restoration, as we tend to reflect what ‘nature’ and 
‘natural’ means through what it is not, that is, the concept of ‘artificial’. In 
Environmental Values (2008) John O’Neill, Allan Holland and Andrew Light explore 
three different ways of defining the term ‘artefact’. The first sense in which an artefact 
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could be understood is as something that is ‘false’ or ‘phoney’. An example of this first 
way of understanding artificial would be artificial leather. The second sense artificial 
means ‘substitute’. A good example of this second type would be artificial organs or 
joints. An actual embodiment of this type of artificial is the bionic man Rex who is fully 
constructed of artificial body parts such as artificial lungs, bladder, pancreas and so on 
(Goulding, Rawlinson 2013). In the third sense artificial is taken to mean ‘human-
made’. An example of this would be artificial islands which are made by humans rather 
than occurring in nature. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 128.)  
The sense in which artificial should be understood in the context of environmental 
philosophy is in the last sense, in the sense of man-made. As noted by O’Neill et al. this 
view needs some fine-tuning. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 128.) In order to properly understand 
what is meant by an artefact we must look deeper into what conditions must apply until 
we can call a thing, being or entity an artefact. O’Neill et al. suggest that the ‘idea of 
contrivance’ must be introduced and is exactly what Mill did when he referred to 
’voluntary and intentional agency’. According to O’Neill et al., “[s]omething is artificial 
only if it is the result of a deliberate or intentional agency” (O’Neill et al. 2008, 128). 
The second requirement is to “distinguish between the result and the aim of a deliberate 
or intentional act” (O’Neill et al. 2008, 128). It is important to make this distinction, 
since in the case of global warming; even though it is most likely the result of a 
collection of individual deliberate choices, it was clearly not the deliberate aim of these 
choices.  
What kinds of values are assigned to artefacts? The values assigned to artefacts are 
mainly linked to a certain group of properties that it displays. For instance, a knife 
passes of as a knife if it embodies certain properties. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 144.) When it 
comes to knives what matters is that it displays the essential properties well. If a knife is 
not sharp and therefore does not cut well, it is not a great knife. However, I may assign 
extra value to my artefact because of its origin. So Elliot’s idea of history can also be 
attached to artefacts. For instance, if I inherit a clock from my mother, the history, the 
stories and the fact that my mother gave it to me takes prominence. The functional 
features in this case might not matter as much. If the clock does not tell time and keeps 
on running slow does not matter as there is this special additional value(s) that matter 
more. The item is valued as it is with its faults. (O’Neill et al. 2008, 144-5.) The 
interesting feature of history is that “[h]istory blocks the replication of place and the 
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substitutability of one place for another. This is as true for ‘cultural landscapes’ as it is 
for ‘natural landscapes’.” (O’Neill et al. 2008, 145.) 
Another interesting feature that artefacts have is that they deteriorate if left untouched or 
unused. Not only do artefacts need to be created, they also require maintenance in order 
to fulfil the functions they are created to perform. Natural organisms on the other hand 
tend to do the opposite. When human agency is retracted the natural organisms or 
ecosystems tend to recover and flourish (but not necessarily). Looking at the 
characteristics of artefacts and natural items helps to determine which categories 
describes restoration most accurately. 
4.4.1.  The two conditions for artefacts – Helena Siipi 
Helena Siipi aims to define the concept of an artefact in her essay ‘Artefacts and Living 
Artefacts’. She forms the conditions for an entity to be an artefact. With her definition 
she is hoping to clarify the “status of several biotic entities such as gardens, commercial 
fields, polluted natural areas, ecosystems including alien species, restored ecosystems 
and transgenic organisms” (Siipi 2003, 413).  She formulates a double condition for 
artefacts.   
(1) An entity x is an artefact only if x has been intentionally brought into existence by intentionally 
causing the coming artefact x to have certain properties.  
(2) An entity x is an artefact only if causing x to have certain properties has led x to have some new 
functions – that is, functions that are not present in the raw materials of x. (Siipi 2003, 413.) 
Siipi highlights that the question of “[w]hether something is or is not an artefact is not a 
question of ethics but of ontology – even though being an artefact may have moral 
consequences”12(Siipi 2003, 415).   
The thing that distinguishes artefacts from other entities is their history, the way they 
came about. As suggested by the first condition an artefact is brought into existence by 
a human being or humans (or an intentional being) by intentionally modifying the 
properties of the entity. This modification of properties causes the entity to have some 
new features or lose some of its features. Siipi points out that the intentional addition or 
extraction of features does not automatically transfer the entity into an artefact. (Siipi 
2003, 415.) For example, a berry picker who is picking berries in a forest does not turn 
                                                            
12 Her discussion on artefacts will be restricted only to physical entities, even though, her analysis might 
be fitting to nonphysical cases as well, such as works of art (Siipi 2003, 415). 
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the forest into an artefact even though there will be fewer berries after she leaves. 
Furthermore, Siipi adds that “even qualitative changes are not always sufficient for 
artefactuality”13 (Siipi 2003, 415).  For instance, if a skier adds ski tracks to a forest 
whilst skiing through it, it does not turn the forest into an artefact, even though, the 
forest now has a new property of having ski tracks in it (Siipi 2003, 415-416). 
Since the first condition is not sufficient for showing us whether an entity is an artefact, 
a second condition is needed. Accordingly, in the case of restored ecosystems, what 
makes them fall in the category of artefacts has to do with their history and these two 
conditions proposed by Siipi can clarify this situation. Let us consider an example used 
by Siipi. A natural meadow has been destroyed by a mining company which is seeking 
to extract some valuable minerals found on the site. Once the minerals have been 
extracted the company restores the area to its former glory. One cannot tell the 
difference between the original and natural meadow and the restored meadow. (Siipi 
2003, 425.) So is the new restored meadow an artefact? According to Siipi, the restored 
meadow is an artefact, since “[t]he current meadow has been intentionally brought into 
existence by intentionally causing the coming meadow to have certain properties” (Siipi 
2003, 425). The ‘meadow’ that was left after the mining procedures had finished could 
not really be called a meadow anymore. Consequently the restoration works had 
brought into existence a new entity. However, the important factor for an entity to be 
considered an artefact is whether in the process of modification new functions came 
about. Usually the reason for restoring natural areas is not solely based on the 
enjoyment of the restoration process, but in some other explicit reason for wanting the 
area to be in a certain way. These reasons would probably be something like ‘the 
restored area will help to preserve biodiversity’. The reasons for restoring a damaged 
area reveal the new functions that are produced. (Siipi 2003, 425-426.) 
In addition, animals might perform intentional acts and so produce artefacts. A 
commonly used example of artefacts produced by animals are beaver’s dams. Siipi and 
Holland et al. mention that animals might also be capable of producing artefacts. In 
order to know this, we need to know whether these acts are made intentionally and 
whether the two conditions apply to these actions. For the scope of this essay, I will not 
                                                            
13 Italics added by the author. 
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go into further discussion about whether animals produce artefacts or not. I do not rule 
out that possibility. 
4.2. Nature as wilderness 
In this section I shall take a closer look at what we mean by ‘wilderness’ and how 
wilderness is related to the concept of ‘nature’ and how it sits altogether in the 
restoration debate. I shall do this by looking at a critique on the concept of wilderness 
from J. Baird Callicott and advocate of the concept of wilderness from Reed F. Noss. I 
will then aim to define the concept of ‘nature’ myself taking into account the 
complexities we have discussed so far. 
4.2.2. A critique of wilderness - J. Baird Callicott 
J. Baird Callicott criticizes the concept of ‘wilderness’ in the article ‘A Critique of and 
an Alternative to the Wilderness Idea’ (Callicott 1995, 437). According to Callicott, ”we 
must reexamine the received wilderness idea, that is, the idea that wilderness is ”an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man is a 
visitor who does not remain”” (Callicott 1995, 437).  Callicott’s aim is not to rob the 
wilderness areas of their designated meaning of being highly natural and pristine areas. 
On the contrary, his aim is to strengthen conservation efforts. According to him, the 
problem is in the basic idea of wilderness, in the dichotomy of wilderness and the 
human habited world. This dichotomy has lead us to a situation where the planet is 
divided into zones where “environmentally destructive human economic activities […] 
would be permitted and areas where such activities would be excluded”(Callicott 1995, 
437-438).    
Callicott also draws attention to the problem that our current concept of ‘wilderness’ is 
unhistorical. He notes that “at the historical level, we are beginning to realize that 
wilderness is an ethnocentric concept” (Callicott 1995, 438). Many perceived 
wilderness areas are not in fact ‘wilderness’ in the sense we would like to think they are. 
In reality many of these areas have been “actively managed” by human beings. 
(Callicott 1995, 139.) These wilderness areas are actually “artificial wilderness – though 
that combination of words seems oxymoronic” (Callicott 1995, 139).    
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Another problem with the concept of ‘wilderness’ is that it appears to freeze time to 
some arbitrary point that needs to be preserved. This idea of ‘wilderness’ relies on the 
impression that ecosystems are stable unless disturbed. However, Callicott mentions 
that this impression of a stable ecosystem has shifted and it is now believed that 
ecosystems are constantly changing. In fact, it is currently thought that being unstable is 
an ordinary state of ecosystems. Callicott emphasises that paradoxically the wilderness 
ideal is only attainable through extensive management, which is exactly what would 
strip away an areas wilderness status. (Callicott 1995, 139.) In addition, Callicott has a 
problem with the ‘pre-Darwian myth’ of the ‘man’, which is the general consensus that 
man exists outside of nature. The religious view that man has been created by God and 
consequently is unique and distinct from nature, go hand in hand with the wilderness 
idea. Darwin was the one who brought the idea of a man back to the face of earth. With 
the theory of evolution he showed that “human beings are mere accidents of natural 
selection” and therefore are as much part of nature as any other species. Darwin’s 
theory shows that human beings have their rightful place in nature. In contrast, the 
wilderness ideal claims the opposite. It is also unhelpful when evaluating human action 
as it judges all human impact as necessarily negative. (Callicott 1995, 439.)  
The main thesis of Callicott’s article is the need for an alternative for the wilderness 
idea in conservation philosophy. The alternative that Callicott proposes is the concept of 
‘biosphere reserve’. The reason why ‘biosphere reserve’ would serve as a better concept 
to drive conservation policies is that biosphere reserves are chosen according to the 
areas ecological qualities and not based on scenic qualities or on the uselessness of the 
land. For instance, National Parks such as Yellowstone and Yosemite were designated 
as national parks because of their “uselessness for practically any other purpose”. 
(Callicott 1995, 438-440.) Instead Callicott’s ecological reserves are meant for 
preserving biological integrity and ecosystem health. In addition, it allows human 
management procedure (housing developments and economic activity) which the 
wilderness idea rejects. (Callicott 1995, 440.)  
4.2.3. For wilderness: a response to Callicott – Reed F. Noss   
Reed F. Noss is not satisfied with Callicott’s arguments. Noss thinks that Callicott’s 
dismissal of ‘wilderness’ as the key concept in restoration is wrong. He dislikes the way 
Callicott argues that the wilderness idea has lost its merit, and by saying this “Callicott 
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erects a straw man of wilderness (based essentially on the Wilderness Act of 1964) that 
is 30 years out of date”. (Noss 1995, 444.) Noss points out that the view of wilderness 
that Callicott describes is outdated and that he would struggle to find anyone who would 
define ‘wilderness’ in the sense Callicott has. According to Noss;  
[e]veryone with any brain knows that wilderness boundaries are permeable, that ecosystems are dynamic 
entities, that humans are fundamentally part of nature (though a malignant part), and that ecological 
management is essential in most modern wilderness areas and other reserves if we want to maintain 
biodiversity and ecological integrity. To “let nature run its course” in small, isolated reserves burgeoning 
with alien species and uncontrolled herbivores is to watch passively while an accident victim bleeds to 
death. (Noss 1995, 444.)    
Noss does not agree with Callicott that wilderness preservation has failed, but instead 
thinks that the failure rests on the ‘multiple-use management’ of land. Because the 
multiple-use areas are spreading further and wilderness areas are harder to find, it is 
now more than ever that we need to procure wilderness areas that are out of reach of 
intensive utilisation of land. (Noss 1995, 445.)  
According to Noss, the concept of wilderness should be preserved and does not need an 
alternative. Preferably the wilderness ideal should be incorporated into “a broader vision 
of recovered but dynamic landscapes dominated by wildland but complemented by true 
civilization” (Noss 1995, 447). He does agree with Callicott that it has been a mistake to 
exclude the indigenous humans from their homes once the area has been turned into a 
national park. However, Noss thinks that it is not a mistake to exclude humans who are 
living the unsustainable industrial lifestyles from natural wilderness areas. According to 
Noss, what separate humans from nature is our culture and current unsustainable 
lifestyles. (Noss 1995, 445.)  
I find problems with both Callicott’s and Noss’ view. I agree with Callicott that 
‘wilderness’ can potentially be a very problematic concept and the way it is often 
understood risks making wilderness static and unhistorical. The concept of ‘wilderness’ 
can potentially ignore the human history a particular landscape has. Natural areas are 
not static, they have evolved throughout history changing slightly over time. This 
characteristic should be included in the concept of ‘wilderness’. I agree that these 
difficulties pose problems in the discussions of conservation. However, I do not think 
that we need to add a third concept into the mix. We already have two controversial 
concepts (‘wilderness’ and ‘nature’), hence in the name of clarity, I would not introduce 
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a third one. I believe the problems Callicott has could possibly be avoided by defining 
the concept of ‘nature’ differently. I will discuss this point in the next section. Likewise, 
I disagree with Noss’ response. The concept of ‘wilderness’ is unfortunately very 
restrictive. The concept debars humans from wilderness. ‘Wilderness’ means 
‘untouched by humans’ and as a consequence when in contact with intentional human 
action, it will automatically change the status of ‘wilderness’ into something different. 
Noss cannot incorporate human action into the concept of ‘wilderness’ without 
completely changing its meaning. 
4.3. Redefining the concept of ‘nature’ 
In this section I am hoping to shed some light on the murky situation that still prevails 
with the difficulties of defining the concept of ‘nature’. Eric Higgs has made the point 
nicely, “[d]ismissing conceptual debate ignores the power of language in shaping belief 
and practice” (Higgs 2003, 94). It is not sufficient to only define what ecological 
restoration means and ignore the core concept that it relies on – that is the concept of 
‘nature’. Ignoring the concept of ‘nature’ is like doing half of the job. In order to define 
‘ecological restoration’ clearly we must be clear what is meant by ‘nature’, after all it is 
nature that restoration is targeting. My aim is to redefine the concept of ‘nature’ more 
accurately with the aid of the concept of ‘wilderness’. I am hoping this new way of 
defining the concept of nature will help us when dealing with ecological restoration. In 
doing this I will use Mill’s second definition for the concept of nature, Elliot’s idea of 
the ‘right continuity with the past’ and Siipi’s definition of artefacts. 
I shall argue that ‘wilderness’ can be a very useful concept because it can be used to 
lighten the burden that the concept of ‘nature’ has to bear. On its own, the concept of 
‘nature’ is extremely complex and equivocal. Mill defined it in two different ways and 
Hume has managed to find four different meanings to the concept of nature (O’Neill et 
al. 2008, 127). I believe we should divide the equivocal meaning that ‘nature’ has 
between the two concepts, ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’.   
‘Wilderness’ is defined as pristine nature that is untouched by humans. It would, 
therefore, make sense to shift this meaning from nature to ‘wilderness’ and “release” 
‘nature’ of this burden. I believe we need a concept that describes the part of nature that 
does not include humans. After all, humans have not always been here and it can serve 
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as an important indicator of the appropriate place for humans among other species. 
‘Wilderness’ as a concept embodies the autonomy nature has and also tells us 
something valuable about the human-nature relationship. ‘Wilderness’ expresses the 
reality that we are only a small part of the long history of nature. Consequently, I do not 
think we need to redefine this concept like Callicott did. The beauty of this move is that 
adjustments are made on the concept that is already problematic and still remains 
unclear among environmental philosophers. The concept of ‘wilderness’ on the other 
hand seems to be slightly clearer. Therefore, it would make sense to make adjustments 
to the concept of ‘nature’ rather than the concept of ‘wilderness’. I admit that 
‘wilderness’ can be a very value-laden and strictly dualist concept. In addition, it does 
have some problematic etymological weight to carry.
14
 ‘Pristine nature’ might be a good 
alternative to ‘wilderness’, but in the name of simplicity, I would like to avoid adding a 
third concept to the mix. 
Since the concept of ‘wilderness’ already captures the meaning of a pristine natural area 
untouched by man, the concept of nature does not need to have the exact same meaning. 
If we want to refer to pristine, untouched, natural area to the highest degree, we should 
refer to ‘wilderness’. So in a sense, ‘wilderness’ would be a more specified term that 
means areas that are natural to the highest degree possible. In other words, ‘wilderness’ 
has its origin in the concept of ‘nature’, but it has a more specified meaning compared 
to the concept of ‘nature’. Wilderness areas are all natural but not all natural areas are 
wilderness areas. I am applying Mill’s second definition of nature and using Siipi’s 
definition of artefacts to outline my definition of ‘nature’. My proposed definition of 
nature would include everything in the world apart from artefacts.   
 ‘Natural’ is not an absolute term. As I mentioned earlier, Elliot believes that natural 
environments have value “because they are natural to a high degree” (Elliot 2003, 383). 
Some areas might be more natural than others. For example, the European rural 
landscapes that have been cultivated by man are not as natural as untouched pristine 
wilderness in America. The rural European landscape is still nature and is still natural, 
but not as natural as it used to be and not as natural as pristine wilderness areas. Since 
                                                            
14 This is exactly what has caused the wilderness debate in the first place. In addition, the word wild is 
part of the word wilderness which signifies that wilderness is wild nature, something opposite to tame. 
This might give wilderness some problematic etymological weight.  
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the European rural landscape is less natural (due to the artefacts it embodies) than 
pristine wilderness areas it lacks the full amount of natural value.  
‘Wilderness’ by comparison is an absolute term. Something either is or is not 
wilderness.  By definition ‘wilderness’ areas are lost when humans are around, but this 
does not apply with nature. Wilderness is a type of nature. Restoration deals with less 
natural areas and conservation can deal with both. I shall also argue in terms of Elliot, 
that wilderness is a value-adding property, that is, that wilderness areas embody a 
significant amount of value (Elliot 2003, 11-12). This appears to be an intuitive claim 
and is consistent with the majority of the literature on wilderness. 
The way of finding out how natural an area really is, is by looking at its history. Here 
we would be employing Elliot’s idea of the right type of genesis. In the case of 
restoration what we have lost is wilderness but we have not lost nature. However, it is 
important to point out that with restoration, the status of wilderness of the site has 
already been lost, prior to the restoration activity, due to human caused degradation. 
When humans intervene the natural area loses its status as wilderness. So restoration is 
incompatible with wilderness. However, restoration is not incompatible with nature. 
Natural areas that are being restored have undeniably lost some of the natural value 
when they were damaged by human exploitation. If the human impact has been very 
grave the area lacks a lot of natural value. Nevertheless, when an area is being restored 
some or most of the natural value can be restored as well. Unfortunately the causal 
continuity with the past has been damaged for good; a restored nature cannot regain its 
wilderness status.
15
 Wilderness is highly dependent on historical continuity. I believe 
my concept of wilderness would be consistent with Elliot’s and Katz’s ideas of nature 
as opposed to human action however, I am less confident that they would agree.     
If we were then to make value evaluations on a European rural landscape and a pristine 
untouched wilderness site, we must take in consideration the natural values and non-
natural values each site has.
16
 It is easy to judge that the wilderness area by definition 
has more natural value compared to the rural landscape. However, it is difficult to say 
                                                            
15 For instance, Bill McKibben argues that humans have already ended nature, because nature as an 
autonomous force does not exist anymore, due to the fact that humans have managed to affect and change 
the weather, which in turn will affect every part of the planet. What McKibben refers to as nature I would 
define as wilderness. See McKibben, Bill (2006 [1989]): The End of Nature. Random House Trade 
Paperback, New York. 
16 The evaluation should include value-adding properties of the wilderness site, the value of man-made 
artefacts and human values that exist in the rural landscape. 
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which landscape has more value overall, as the rural landscape might have an 
extraordinary history about it, have beautiful historic buildings and/or it might be 
inhabited by humans who have a particularly meaningful relationship with the 
surrounding nature. Similarly the wilderness area might be one of a kind (exhibiting 
rareness), contain biodiversity, contain extraordinary beauty or have a special 
evolutionary history. All of these factors should be taken into account when judging the 
overall value of a place. It is not always given that a wilderness site will have more 
overall value than a natural landscape. 
The problem I have with the proposed concept of ‘nature’ held by many environmental 
philosophers is that they forget or fail to see that nature is all around us. For instance, 
when I go to my summer cottage I do not feel that I am in an artificial space. Instead I 
feel like I am surrounded by nature, even though there are many other summer cottages 
in the vicinity. I believe we should loosen the concept of ‘nature’, to permit the idea that 
nature, in a way, is all around us and to permit humans into the realm of nature. 
However, when the double condition proposed by Siipi is in place the things that are 
consistent with Siipi’s two conditions count as artefacts. Artefacts have a different 
ontological status compared to natural things, that is, they have come into being in very 
different ways that define their existence. In short, artefacts are made and natural things 
come into being as part of natural processes. I think it is important to add that 
artefactuality is not a definitive state. If, for example, a garden which is a human 
artefact is left untouched for several years, it loses the qualities and the functions that 
made it a garden in the first place. Symmetric beauty and tidiness might be some of the 
qualities and functions that the garden was built to have. Once the gardener stops taking 
care of the garden it will slowly loose these characteristics and functions that made it a 
human artefact – it will cease to be a garden.      
Another good example of this is the case of the Demilitarized Zone separating North 
and South Korea. Since it is a strictly enforced zone, for 60 years it has excluded human 
action from the area. This has made it a sanctuary to multiple endangered species. 
Within the Demilitarized Zone, nature has been able to rehabilitate the area and restore 
itself to the natural state it once was. (Kim 1997, 242-243.) Here again the lack of 
human intervention has created space where nature has been able restore itself. I would 
claim that the area is more natural now than it was 60 years ago. It is not a wilderness 
area but a natural area to high degree. The past human actions have left a mark on the 
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area hence it does not have the right type of causal continuity with the past to grant it 
wilderness status, but it would be absurd to claim that it was an artefact or non-natural.    
These issues underlying the concept of ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’ become apparent when 
aiming to define the concept of restoration. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to 
define the concept of restoration without attempting to understand what ‘nature’ means. 
In fact, restoration is a perfect acid test for the concept of ‘nature’, this is because 
restoration brings us to the borderline of nature, natural, man-made and artefacts. 
Restoration reflects perfectly our misrepresentation and misunderstanding of nature. 
Many philosophers have acknowledged the complexities that lie within the concept of 
nature. I have considered how complex and equivocal the concept of ‘nature’ can be in 
this chapter. Despite these enormous complexities we have reduced everything it stands 
for into one word. One word has to carry the enormous philosophical and semantic 
burden of everything that there is, everything we are and everything that is distinct from 
us. We have assigned a massive theoretical load for the concept of ‘nature’. No wonder 
problems arise. Instead the concept of ‘nature’ should be understood as an umbrella 
term for all natural things. I do not claim to have resolved the definitional issues with 
the concept of ‘nature’, however, I hope I have managed to show the important issues 
that come with the concept. My aim has been to provide a definition that might bring 
some of these tensions to rest and consequently help to provide a clearer understanding 
of the concept of restoration. Restoration, which is a relatively new practice, brings a 
whole new dimension to environmental philosophy and into our relationship with 
nature. This brings us a perfect opportunity to re-evaluate what ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ 
means in order to ensure clear and comprehensive definition for ‘ecological restoration’ 
and what counts as good ecological restoration.  
5. Conceptual evaluation of ecological restoration 
Now that I have established that there are serious definitional issues within the debate 
surrounding restoration, it is a perfect place for me to attempt to contribute to the 
debate. In Higgs’ words; “[c]onfusion over proper description and definition reflects an 
inadequate understanding of concepts” (Higgs 2003, 94). I believe the search for the 
correct definition for ecological restoration should begin with understanding the concept 
of ‘nature’, which was discussed at length in chapter four. We need to be absolutely 
clear what we are talking about and ensure we are talking about the same thing. I will 
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use the definition of nature that I formulated and use it in my enquiry of ecological 
restoration.
17
 I believe that a comprehensive definition of ecological restoration must be 
a combination of ecological and philosophical understanding of natural ecosystems. 
Ignoring one is like reading every other page of a book. This is because restoration 
targets both ecosystems and the human relationship with nature. If we combine both 
philosophical and ecological understanding of nature we should end up with a 
comprehensive definition that is consistent with scientific research and with our 
philosophical understanding of natural environments. Not spending enough time 
formulating an acceptable definition can have serious complications for the future 
development of ecological restoration as a profession. It could even lead to restoration 
losing its language (Higgs 2003, 94). This can easily happen if philosophers, 
environmentalists, ecologists and restoration ecologists do not agree on a suitable 
meaning for ecological restoration, which will in turn lead to confusion over the practice 
and the overall identity and purpose of the field. The confusion could also leave an 
undefined concept vulnerable for anyone, including adversaries of restoration, to finish 
the job. The aforementioned is a serious worry and can lead to restoration becoming a 
caricature of itself. Another important reason to define the concept carefully is that “[a]n 
acceptable definition is a precondition for deciding what constitutes good restoration” 
(Higgs 2003, 94). It is vital for a profession with such great responsibility to be able to 
distinguish between good restoration projects and bad ones. It is also important to be 
able to distinguish between restoration projects from non-restoration projects. After all a 
strong definition is the precondition for a profession’s purpose and significance. (Higgs 
2003, 94-95.) 
 
I will start by looking into ecology for guidance after which I will use philosophical 
analysis to put flesh on the bones. I will then aim to clarify my concept by investigating 
it under the four themes that were discussed at the very beginning of this thesis, that is: 
goals, values, means and overall outcome. I will then look at problems facing ecological 
restoration that it must be able to resolve. 
 
                                                            
17 There is an important distinction between the concepts of restoration ecology and ecological 
restoration. These are often treated as interchangeable concepts. However, there is a difference between 
them, Higgs refers “to restoration ecology as the ensemble of practices that contribute to the science of 
ecological restoration. Ecological restoration is the total set of ideas and practices (social, scientific, 
economic, political, and so on) involved in the restoration of ecosystem.” (Higgs 2003, 81.) 
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I will begin with ecology. According to Andre F. Clewell, a restorationist and a plant 
ecologist, and James Aronson, a restoration ecologist, “[t]he basic unit of ecology, and 
thus of ecological restoration, is an ecosystem” (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 9). 18 
Clewell and Aronson define ecosystems as complex, open systems that “interact with 
each other” (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 9). The term ‘ecosystem’ refers to a system 
combined of both biotic and abiotic components that “influence the flow of energy and 
elements” (Cain, Bowman, Hacker 2014, 451-452). Here I would like to emphasise the 
interaction between organisms and ecosystems, which appears to be missing from 
Elliot’s and Katz’s analysis of nature. Interaction of organisms is prerequisite of life. 
Humans do not live in a vacuum but depend on the surrounding ecosystems and must 
interact with their surroundings in order to survive. For instance, nature’s 
interconnectedness means that when an ecosystem is impaired it can easily affect the 
neighbouring ecosystems. However, Clewell and Aronson highlight that the boundaries 
created by the concept of an ecosystem are ultimately designed to aid the ecologists or 
other environmental professionals to delineate their area of interest or study and 
therefore, the concept is ultimately manmade. The idea of an ecosystem is an act of 
“definitional circumscription” and “is necessarily subjective, because the biosphere is 
an interconnected and interacting whole that defies partition, but this objection does not 
detract from its usefulness”. (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 10.) Therefore, the purpose of 
the term is to set boundaries for restoration projects (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 10).  
 
Historical ecological trajectory or historical fidelity as it is called by Eric Higgs, is one 
of the core concepts for ecological restoration. Clewell and Aronson define it as “the 
sequential changes in expression that an ecosystem undergoes through time”. When an 
ecosystem is damaged this will cause an interruption into its historic trajectory. The aim 
of ecological restoration is to steer the ecosystem back to its historical trajectory. 
(Clewell and Aronson 2013, 4.) Because ecological restoration aims to repair the 
historic ecological trajectory in a changing world “the outcome of ecological restoration 
is necessarily a contemporary expression and not a return to the past”, even though 
many of the species that existed in the predisturbed structure would remain (or would be 
reintroduced) in the restored ecosystem (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 5). The main 
                                                            
18 An ecosystem is by no means an easy concept, which is probably the reason why the debate 
surrounding ecological restoration is so extensive and eclectic. I believe the debate to be only so 
complicated as its underlying parts. 
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attitude among ecological restorationists seems to be fairly modest. They are aware that 
time is not reversible and therefore, a return to the past is not an option. The best that 
can be done in the situation is to restore the damaged ecosystem into a state that 
emulates the structural aspects and the characteristics of the ecosystem that existed 
before the disturbance. (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 5.) 
 
Thus a natural ecosystem is the goal of restoration projects. A fitting way to investigate 
what natural ecosystems are like is by contrasting them to production systems.  
 
A production ecosystem, as opposed to a natural ecosystem, is a unit of land or water that is transformed 
– often simplified in ecological terms – and then managed by people to produce crops as commodities 
with market value or for direct consumption and subsistence (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 10). 
 
What is characteristic about production systems as opposed to natural systems is that 
production systems are “neither self-organizing nor self-sustaining”. A production 
system requires constant human management in order to retain a good level of 
productivity and in order to achieve the goals that have been assigned to it. Clewell and 
Aronson remark that “[a]ll of these so-called improvements require periodic operation, 
maintenance, and eventual replacement”. (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 11.) Here a clear 
difference between the natural and artificial becomes apparent. Natural systems are self-
organising and self-sustaining systems, whereas artificial systems (or production 
systems) are not and require constant maintenance to reach the goals that have been 
assigned to them. In addition, natural systems do not have goals, while production 
systems are created to serve a certain purpose. Consequently restoration is aiming to 
restore the self-organising and self-sustaining characteristics of natural environments.  
 
Higgs emphasises that ecological restoration is more than just applied ecology and 
conservation biology, it includes;  
 
community-based initiatives, urban regeneration, natural gardening, landscape design, and social justice 
perspectives. Definitions of restoration should encompass all of these approaches, which is why so much 
ink has been spilled and so many arguments have been erupted over the core and limits of ecological 
restoration […] By inhabiting the boundaries of contemporary cultural belief, restoration invites criticism 
of our technological society. (Higgs 2013, 92.)  
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This border-crossing character is what makes ecological restoration so fascinating and 
so complicated at the same time (Higgs 2013, 92).  
5.1. Restorations, replicas and fakes  
From a philosophical perspective I would like to begin by using Alistair Gunn’s 
conceptual analysis of ecological restoration that is put forward in his article “The 
Restoration of Species and Natural Environments”(1991). His investigation targets not 
only the word “restoration” but also the associated words; “replicas” and “fakes”. 
According to Gunn, a replica is a copy of an original item which needs to match a high 
level of resemblance. A successful replica would be indistinguishable from the original. 
In addition, a replica requires the existence of the original which defines the success of 
the resemblance. The purpose of a replica is not to fool anyone, even though it might do 
so. Deception is not its definitional requirement. (Gunn 1991, 303.) A fake or a forgery 
on the other hand, is aimed at deception. A fake is the result of dishonest intent of the 
faker. However, fakes are in a sense a broader category as fakes are not restricted to 
replicas, but can also include novel items that mimic the style of the original. An 
example of a fake would be Van Meegeren’s successful forgeries of famous artist 
Vermeer’s work. (Gunn 1991, 303.) Van Meegeren copied Vermeer’s techniques and 
studied his life, in order to produce paintings that were not in fact copies of Vermeer’s 
original work but new creations that Van Meegeren hoped to pass as lost works of 
Vermeer. Replicas become fakes once there is intention to deceive. Restoration, 
however, is different to fakes and replicas, as restoration “is an original which has been 
damaged or partially destroyed in some way and has now been brought back to its 
original appearance.” (Gunn 1991, 303.) Deception is rarely the goal of restoration 
projects. On the contrary, the fact that we aim to restore a damaged painting, historical 
building or an ecosystem shows that it is of importance and we do not want to see it 
destroyed. What makes restorations potentially so controversial, according to Gunn, is 
the fact that restoration deals directly with the original, unlike the case with fakes or 
replicas. In other words, restorations can never co-exist with the originals “for a 
restoration of A is A, restored”. (Gunn 1991, 303-304.)   
 
An important point with Gunn’s conceptual analysis is that if an ecosystem has been 
completely destroyed, no original exists. This seems to render some cases of restoration 
42 
 
impossible.
19
 We would not in fact be restoring the ecosystem but replicating it. In my 
opinion, this is a major factor in making restoration so controversial for most 
philosophers. Especially malicious restoration may often require total destruction of the 
original ecosystem, therefore destroying the original ecosystem completely and 
replacing it with a replica, a human-created ecosystem that looks very much like the 
original. This example is problematic and does seem to involve loss of values.
20
 We saw 
earlier how Elliot and Katz argued that restorations are impossible as they cannot 
restore the natural value found in nature. However, it appears that restorations are also 
impossible on a conceptual level, if the original ecosystem has been completely 
destroyed, which is the case with clear-cut logging and open pit mining. With 
restoration projects that aim to restore ecosystems which have been completely 
destroyed, the restoration practitioners do not appear to be restoring, but in fact 
replicating. This is an important point and must be kept in mind when defining 
restoration. Gunn’s definitions have conceptual appeal and reflect the raw reality of the 
situation – a clear-cut forest is not a forest anymore and if it was “restored” it would 
definitely not be the same forest, but a new forest. This definitional analysis is 
consistent with Siipi’s definition of artefacts. Siipi believes that not all human action in 
nature results in artefacts. However, when creating a replica, we are intentionally 
creating something new (which has new properties and new functions) which satisfies 
the double condition for artefactuality. I believe this is partly why we feel so strongly 
about practices such as clear-cut mining and clear-cut forestry. It destroys the original 
completely and, on a conceptual level, we are aware that even restoration efforts are 
unable to bring the original environments back as it is impossible to restore if the 
original no longer exists. This conceptual clarification is missing in Katz’s, Elliot’s, 
Light’s and Higgs’ enquiry. I will come back to this point concerning the difference 
between restoration and replication and how this difference affects their value. Going 
forward we should distinguish replication from restoration by calling these replication 
projects. 
 
It is important to point out that this conceptual clarification would only render 
destructive restoration projects impossible. Restoration projects that are aimed at 
damaged ecosystems, not destroyed ones, would still count as restoration projects. 
                                                            
19 Gunn only concentrates on originals. He does not take a stance on what is natural. 
20 I will come back to this issue regarding values in the next chapter 5.3. 
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However, one could point out that ecosystems are destroyed by natural forces all the 
time. Natural fires can burn entire forests to the ground and volcanic eruptions destroy 
everything in their vicinity. These are all natural occurrences. If the complete 
destruction of ecosystems is part of nature, why is it different when the source of 
destruction is human? To illuminate this issue, let us take a look at an example of such 
natural destruction and take a closer look at what happens at the site. Natural fires can 
burn hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. For example, in the Rocky Mountain, a 
mountain range that exists in North America, large fires are a “landscape phenomenon” 
and are likely to increase as climate change sets in. Here fires are part of the ecosystem 
as is the case in most, if not all, ecosystems. Often large fires that destroy vast areas are 
seen as catastrophes and something to be avoided, however, large fires are 
”characteristic of most Rocky Mountain ecosystems under the HRV”21. (Baker 2009, 1-
4.) In fact, vast forest fires do not have disastrous effects on the plants and animals that 
reside in the area. On the contrary, the animal and plant species appear to thrive in the 
nutrient rich environment following the post-fire environment. (Baker 2009, 4, 62-100, 
101-130.) According to Baker, the “Rocky Mountain ecosystems are capable of full 
recovery after fire, and seeding, logging, and other postfire actions will be shown to 
actually slow or permanently damage natural postfire recovery” (Baker 2009, 4).   
 
In order to be consistent we must admit that extensive wild fire will also lead to the 
destruction of the affected ecosystem or ecosystems. It should not matter whether the 
cause is human or non-human. This could be the case in some instances, however, as 
Baker argues fire is a “landscape phenomenon” and characteristic to the Rocky 
Mountain ecosystem. It is, in a way, part of the ecosystem. Even though fire results in 
the death of many individual plants and animals, fire does not result in the death of the 
wider species. Because the fire has been part of the Rocky Mountain ecosystem the 
species have developed survival tactics. Most animals are able to escape or find refuge 
from the fire. Plants on the other hand have several survival strategies such as: 
resprouting, resisting the fire by growing a thick protective bark or seed bankers 
                                                            
21 “HRV refers to “the ecological conditions, and the spatial and temporal variation in these conditions, 
that are relatively unaffected by people, within a period of time and geographical area” (in Baker 2009, 3. 
Quoted Landres, Morgan, and Swanson 1999). 
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including serotinous
22
 seed release, to name a few. In the end, the species will survive 
either as an individual by resisting the fire, by escaping or by continuing the species’ 
existence by releasing seeds that will survive the fire. (Baker 2009, 62-100.) For 
example lodgepole pine, a seed banker storing seeds either in the canopy or in the soil, 
ensures species survival by releasing seeds immediately following the death of the 
individual. In fact “[m]ost resprouter, resister, and seed-banker trees in the Rockies have 
wind-dispersed seeds and can thus also function as community or landscape persisters 
[…] suggesting one strategy is not always effective”. (Baker 2009, 64.) If the species 
manage to escape, persist or disperse their seeds successfully, it seems that the same 
forest is able to remain albeit, in a damaged stage. After all, death of individuals is part 
of life. The ecosystem does not and cannot have the exact same species mix forever. If 
the fire is so severe that it manages to kill everything in sight, then we must admit that 
the original forest has been destroyed and replaced by a new one or with a completely 
new type of ecosystem.  
 
The ultimate point that Gunn aims to show is that if the environmental damage is severe 
enough we have lost the original ecosystem. In other words, “[a] clear-cut forest is no 
longer a forest at all”. (Gunn 1991, 306.) Aiming to restore a clear-cut forest is 
impossible as we have lost the original. In this case the best we can do is replication, 
which means creating a new forest that is very similar to the one that existed before. 
These two forests have different histories. The original forest evolved naturally was 
clear-cut by a company and ceased to exist. Then a new forest was replanted by the 
same company and resembles the original forest that stood there before. (Gunn 1991, 
306-7.) 
 
If human destruction and environmental forces can completely destroy an entire 
ecosystem we are faced with two difficult problems. (1) What is the point of restoration 
if the original is lost? Why is replicating better than creating something new? (2) Can 
we know the exact point the original ceases to exist? Issue (1) is an issue regarding 
values and overall attitude of restoration (or replication projects). Even if restoration 
would strictly speaking be impossible due the lack of original, we might still have duty 
                                                            
22 Serotiny is a term in ecology describing ecological adaptation of certain seeds to their environments. In 
our example of Rocky Mountains, some trees will release their seeds in response to a trigger, which in 
this case would be fire. 
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to return the environment back to the structure resembling the predisturbance 
conditions. I will elaborate in section 5.6. Regarding issue (2), how many trees would 
one need to cut in order to destroy a forest? This question will take us to what I will call 
the Ship of Theseus problem. To what extent can the original be changed before it is 
changed completely?
23
 I think we struggle with the same philosophical dilemma with 
restoration. What makes matters even more complicated is questioning how we can 
have an original state when ecosystems are dynamic and constantly changing? I believe 
this issue is ultimately an issue with goals (more specifically the goal of historical 
continuity) and means. In order to secure the identity of the original we need to be 
cautious in assessing how the restoration is executed – how we restore (means) and 
which historical state do we use as our reference condition (goals).  
 
Stephany Mills has put the core idea of restoration nicely, “[i]t is what can be done 
when it’s too late to conserve.” (Mills 1995, 45.) In other words, restoration deals with 
the damaged ecosystem and therefore attempts to do the best thing in a bad situation. I 
believe this encapsulates the negative feel that restoration is condemned to carry. 
Something wrong has happened at restoration sites, otherwise there would be no 
restoration sites.
24
 However, I believe that in order to stay as objective in regards to the 
true status of restoration as possible, we must distinguish between the act that rendered 
the ecosystem in a damaged state and the act of restoration. There is no necessary link 
between the two.  
 
Light’s bisection of restoration into malevolent and benevolent restoration is extremely 
useful because it brings this causal link to the surface. This is where Elliot (in his article 
“Faking Nature” (1982)) and Katz get confused as they appear to treat all restoration 
projects as malicious. I understand malicious restoration to be a case where the link 
between the act of environmental degradation and the act of restoration as a justification 
                                                            
23 The ship of Theseus is a philosophical puzzle most notably found in the writings of by an ancient 
historian Plutarch and later been used by philosopher Thomas Hobbes. According to the story, this 
famous ship was displayed in Athens. However, due to the passing time the wooden planks of the ship 
started to wear down and needed replacing. Little by little the parts of the ship got replaced until the ship 
had no original wooden parts left. So, the question arises, what remains at display in Athens, is it the Ship 
of Theseus or an exact replica of the ship? (Ryan Wasserman 2009) 
24 It is not necessary the case that all restoration sites are necessarily the product of immoral activity. For 
instance, some areas are destroyed because of lack of knowledge and due to the large human populations. 
However, the question arises: what if the sufficient knowledge to avoid the destruction was not acquired 
but it could have been? Due to the scope of my thesis, I will not be able to discuss this here. 
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for this destruction are linked. Nonetheless, there is no necessary link between the act of 
destruction and the act of restoration. At least this needs to be judged on a case by case 
basis. I have understood Light’s benevolent restoration, on the other hand, being an 
example of restoration where the link between the environmental degradation and 
restoration does not exist. Here restoration springs from wanting to do the right thing, 
from willingness to restore the damage and the human relationship with nature. Here 
environmental degradation is completely separate from the act of restoring. The people 
taking part in restoration can be different to the ones that damaged the environment.
25
 I 
believe this imaginary link between the act of destruction and of restoration casts a 
shadow on restoration and it is important not to condemn the practice for the wrong 
reasons. Keeping this in mind I will aim to analyse and define what restoration is by 
looking at the four categories used earlier: goals, values, means and overall attitude.  
5.2. Goals  
Clear goals are essential for the success of restoration projects. In this section I will aim 
to make sense what these goals should be. Goals of restoration projects deal with the 
end product of a project and what that end product should be like in order for the project 
to count as restoration. In addition, goals measure the success of the restoration projects. 
There are two issues that make goal setting particularly challenging. Firstly, restoration 
projects look to nature for the formula, however, such formula cannot really be found in 
nature as nature does not have goals. Secondly, there are the considerable differences 
between goals of restorationists around the world, especially between American and 
European restorationists (Higgs 2003, 93).
26
 In America, the dominant goal for 
restoration has been to restore the damaged ecosystem back to its indigenous state. 
However, Higgs points out that the concept of indigenous nature does not necessarily 
seem sensible in other parts of the world. (Higgs 2003, 93.) Accordingly, should we 
follow the American, European, Asian, African goals or should we aim to accommodate 
them all? I believe that in the face of global environmental destruction and of global 
warming we should be looking at globally applicable goals to go with globally agreed 
                                                            
25 One could argue that in most restoration cases, even though you might have not physically been there 
contributing to the damage, you have in one way or another contributed to the damage by either 
consuming the product or living in society that encourages environmental degradation and encourages 
ever-growing consumption. However, this does not mean that this link must necessarily exist.  
26 I believe this difference has roots in the varying understanding of nature and what counts as natural. 
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concepts for ecological restoration.
27
 The goals should therefore be broad enough to 
include a wide range of restoration activities around the world, but simultaneously be 
able to distinguish between good restoration projects and bad ones, and more 
importantly between restoration projects and projects that simply cannot be counted as 
restoration projects.  
 
Higgs mentions three important issues with a goal oriented view of restoration. Firstly, 
it overlooks the importance of process or the means by which to restore. Particularly 
Higgs places value on involving community members on restoration projects. What was 
learned during the restoration project by the practitioners and community members is 
important and is ignored completely if one only looks at the end product. Secondly, 
“some restorations are never complete” and focusing on the product makes it difficult to 
focus on long-term management of a site, which some sites require. Especially the sites 
that have coevolved with humans require constant human intervention.
28
 Thirdly, the 
outlook in consumer societies supports the idea that products matter more than process. 
One does not need to look far to find proof of this claim – we seem to be concerned 
about unethical labour issues, unethical production processes and environmental 
damage only on a superficial level. If they really were taken seriously, a lot more would 
be done to fix them. Yet comfortable living and availability of products appears to take 
prominence. Higgs is concerned that the product based thinking will spread to 
restoration and lead to commodification of ecosystems. (Higgs 2003, 111.) I believe the 
third issue is consistent with Elliot’s and Katz’s worries towards restoration. Especially 
Katz appears to be overwhelmed by commodification of nature. These three issues must 
be kept in mind when setting goals for restoration.  
 
Ecological integrity and historical fidelity are often put forth as the appropriate goals for 
ecological restoration (Higgs 2003, 95, 111). However, I would also like to add a third 
goal which targets the destructive human lifestyle which has resulted in environmental 
                                                            
27 Because the issues related to ecological restoration are global in nature; our response should also be 
global. It will be an extremely difficult task, but that does not mean that it should not be attempted or 
could not be achieved. 
28 Morava River restoration project is a good case study of an ecosystem that has co-evolved with humans 
and thus requires human management. (See Higgs 2003, 68-73.) 
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degradation in the first place. I call the third goal moral integrity. Ecological integrity
29
 
refers to the health and quality of the ecosystem. Historical fidelity ensures that the 
historical continuum stays intact. In fact, historical continuity should be one of the main 
characteristics of restoration as it separates it from other related environmental 
management practices such as reclamation and rehabilitation. (Higgs 2003, 95.) Moral 
integrity targets the immoral action that led to the destruction of an ecosystem. It urges 
people involved to reflect on what caused the damage and demands for restitution by 
undoing the harm via restoration. In addition, it requires people to mend their moral 
dispositions accordingly. Moral integrity also involves building a more sustainable 
relationship with nature. Let us the take a closer look at these three criteria. 
5.2.1. Ecological integrity 
Ecosystem health and integrity are the key concepts that ecologists use to describe their 
goals in restoration projects. To the contrary “[d]egradation, damage, destruction, and 
transformation all represent deviations from the normal or desired state of an intact 
ecosystem” (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 10). Integrity is an umbrella term 
encompassing a wide variety of components such as intact systems, wholeness and 
resilience. The idea of wholeness is at the very core of integrity. It is a feature that helps 
an ecosystem to tolerate and react to environmental change. (Higgs 2003, 122.) A clear 
divide can be seen between the perennial intact ecosystems that have endured the test of 
time maintaining a mix of organisms and a production system, often a mono-culture 
aiming for monetary profit with short-term view on the future (Higgs 2003, 124). The 
perennial intact ecosystem displays ecological integrity whereas human created 
production systems do not. Converting a natural area into a production system appears 
to strip the ecosystem of its integrity as production systems require constant 
management. Returning the ecological integrity of an ecosystem should be one of the 
main goals of restoration. 
 
However, Clewell and Aronson emphasise that “terms such as damage, repair, integrity, 
and health are all subjective, value-laden terms lacking in scientific objectivity” 
(Clewell and Aronson 2013, 19). These terms are not absolute but come in degrees. For 
                                                            
29 According to Higgs, ecosystem health might be a “more intuitive metaphor” in comparison to 
ecological integrity, however, the word “health” is complicated and comes with a heavy metaphorical 
load. Because of this Higgs wants to avoid the term. (Higgs 2003, 122-124.) 
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someone something is damaged, but for another it is improved.
30
 Individual values and 
preferences make such terms capricious and varying. Ecosystem health is a commonly 
used term, but because of its varying nature, Higgs prefers to use the term integrity. In 
addition, integrity makes a link to some original condition whereas health does not. 
(Higgs 2003, 123-124.) Clewell and Aronson say that in order to escape the issue of 
subjectivity of values, the “terms and conditions” of ecological restoration must be 
defined clearly, even if they cannot be made completely value free (Clewell and 
Aronson 2013, 19-20). I disagree with Clewell’s and Aronson’s insistence to strip the 
goals of value judgements. I believe that values should play a role in our goal setting, 
however, it should not necessarily play a role with all the goals. I argue that the goal of 
ecological integrity should be made as value free as possible, to ensure that we are 
looking at ecosystems from an ecosystem’s point of view and not a human point of 
view.
31
 However, values should play a role in goal setting as a whole. Values should 
play a part in setting goals for historical fidelity and moral integrity. This is to ensure 
that we look at restoration from the point of view of the ecosystem and the point of view 
of humans. Ignoring one could lead to disastrous outcome as the current environmental 
crisis indicates, where nature has been absent in past decision making and goal setting. 
 
An important aspect of ecological integrity is the recovery of the ecosystem.
32
 
According to Higgs, restoration is essentially about assisted recovery (Higgs 2003, 
112). “Restorationists are merely agents in the process of recovery. It would be arrogant 
to imagine that we are capable of dictating the outcome of ecological processes; at best, 
we participate in these processes” (Higgs 2003, 112). I believe this shows how 
philosophers and environmentalists have been slightly overexcited and overanxious 
about the advances of restoration. I think the notion of assisted recovery is particularly 
useful by bringing us down to earth regarding the capabilities of ecological restoration. 
This goes against Katz’s argument, that restoration and human intervention in general, 
strips nature of its autonomy and turns nature into an artefact. Many restoration 
                                                            
30 Examples would include antiques, objects or places with particular history. 
31 Here one could argue that from a purely objective and scientific point of view (if this is possible to 
achieve), that the best thing for ecosystems would be to remove humans completely. After all, restoration 
often includes the removal of invasive or harmful species. Likewise setting goals by only looking at 
values, might also lead to a similar outcome. Should we somehow safeguard human place in the world by 
granting it a special status? I believe the best way to guard against outcomes like the one just mentioned, 
values and science (as value free and objective as possible) should both play a part in goal setting.  
32 In the 2002 SER definition, ecological restoration was defined as assisted recovery.  
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practitioners are aware of the limits of restoration and understand that people can only 
intervene, not dictate. 
 
According to Higgs, “[r]ecovery refers to the biogeochemical processes that allow an 
ecosystem to return to conditions that prevailed prior to disturbance” (Higgs 2003, 112). 
It is important to remember that recovery can happen without human interference.
33
 
“Recovery assumes that autonomous processes produce an integral ecosystem. 
Recovery does not assume that the recovered land is necessarily restored in the sense of 
historical fidelity.” (Higgs 2003, 114.)  
 
Therefore, restoration is not only about assisted recovery but “restoration must involve 
human intention or agency” (Higgs 2003, 114). Recovery is the term to be used in 
places “where ecological processes have worked unassisted” (Higgs 2003, 114). 
Recovery should certainly be one of the goals (embedded in ecological integrity) of 
restoration. However, in order to take Elliot’s historical continuity seriously, human 
agency is required as recovery alone cannot promise that the ecosystem will recover to 
its former state. 
 
Higgs makes an interesting distinction between restoration and recovery. He believes 
restoration is a way to link the place back to its historical trajectory, but recovery is 
unable to guarantee this. Elliot, an advocate of conservation over restoration does admit 
in Faking Nature that in some cases it is better to restore than leave the area degraded. 
According to Elliot, this intervention will destroy natural value that is associated with 
the place, which will only later return once left alone and once the natural processes 
start taking their own path. As noted by Higgs, only restoration can guarantee a return to 
a historical reference point and this way link to historical continuity. If historical 
continuity is an important factor for us, as it is to Elliot, then restoration appears to be 
the only way of returning the site to its historical trajectory.
34
 The restoration process 
cannot obviously erase history and more specifically erase the human neglect and 
interruption over ecosystems, however, it appears to be the best thing to do in a bad 
situation.   
                                                            
33 Due to the lack of predators in Scotland, the highlands vegetation is suffering from overgrazing by 
deer. Removing the deer will lead to vegetation recovery. In fact in places deer have been fenced off to 
allow recovery. 
34 I suppose here one needs to decide whether they value the natural value over historical fidelity.  
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5.2.2. Historical fidelity 
As seen earlier Elliot places a lot of value on historical fidelity or what he terms 
‘historical continuity’. Elliot claims that restoration is unable to fix the historical fidelity 
of a site as it will inevitably grant the ecosystem human origin by contrast of being 
natural. Especially if we are actively seeking a predisturbance condition, human intent 
and action are necessary as I mentioned earlier. I agree with Elliot, that history matters 
and that human action will inevitably leave a mark. It is impossible to change history. 
However, whether this mark is a bad thing is a completely separate question. However, 
history is not only about what was done in the past, but what is done in the present. 
What we do now will be transferred to the history books. Elliot appears to ignore the 
relationship between the present and the past. What kind of history are we writing if we 
do nothing? 
 
Clewell and Aronson define historical fidelity
35
 as “the sequential changes in expression 
that an ecosystem undergoes through time”. When an ecosystem is damaged this will 
interrupt its historic trajectory. The aim of ecological restoration is to steer the 
ecosystem back to its historical trajectory. (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 4.) What is 
evident here is that historical fidelity should be one of the core goals for ecological 
restoration. I would like to illuminate this by using one of Elliot’s examples of badly 
conducted restoration. If one aimed to restore a former eucalyptus forest by planting an 
exotic species of pinus radiata, this would certainly count as a bad example of 
restoration (Elliot 1997, 131). In fact, according to my definition of restoration this 
would not count as restoration at all, but would fall under some other category under 
environmental management. The reason for this is that restoration must be linked to 
history. In order to be count as restoration the present must be linked to the past. 
Creating a novel ecosystem instead of a historical one would not be restoration, but 
instead creation.  
 
One of the biggest issues with restoration is to decide to which point in time we should 
be aiming to restore? As Higgs points out, “[d]eveloping systems have no true point of 
origin or specific moment of creation” (Higgs 2003 119). Consequently, restoration 
“involves an arbitrary choice of historical conditions” (Higgs 2003, 119). Higgs 
                                                            
35 Clewell and Aronson refer to historical continuity as ‘historic ecological trajectory’. 
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proposes two useful concepts to aid with this challenge – historical range of variability 
and reference conditions. Historical range of variability “refers to a reasonable long-
term boundary on change; we can determine this and use it to situate specific restoration 
objectives.” Reference conditions on the other hand “are historical inferences drawn 
from records or remnant ecosystems.” (Higgs 2003, 119.) Unfortunately this does not 
really resolve the problem. Looking at historical data does not offer guidance on what to 
do (Higgs 2003, 142). 
 
However, the commonly agreed goal of restoration is to restore the ecosystem to the 
predisturbance conditions. However, our ability to determine what point in time this 
was, varies depending on the restoration site. This is simple enough with ecosystems 
that have had their first encounter with humans. It is clear enough that one should 
restore back to the state before the disturbance. However, most ecosystems have a long 
human history and therefore it will be difficult to determine to which point in time one 
should return.  
 
Ecosystems are continuously changing, therefore, in order to respond to this change 
restoration practices must also change accordingly. According to Higgs, it is of utmost 
importance to keep the debate regarding the meaning of restoration going. Even though 
the ecosystems and the meaning of restoration might change over time there are certain 
aspects we should hold on to. Higgs insists and I agree that history must be kept in the 
equation. (Higgs 2003, 131.) 
5.2.3. Moral integrity 
I will argue that in order for restoration to count as good restoration it must involve a 
moral aspect, a realisation that the degradation of nature was wrong and that humans 
have a duty to make things right. If restoration does not include this amending of human 
moral character, it will not actually fix the problem. Ultimately, I argue that the issue 
with restoration does not reside only with the issues relating to restoration practices, 
goals and values, but also in our moral integrity. I will illuminate this with a brief 
example. Imagine that two times a year Gavin secretly organises a garden party at his 
friend’s Jessica’s garden. Imagine that Jessica is particularly proud of her garden and 
the amount of hours she has spent to plant and take care of her plants. Gavin’s bi-annual 
garden party always results in the destruction of Jessica’s beloved garden. After seeing 
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her upset Gavin always ends up restoring the garden back to its former condition. 
According to the restoration thesis and the process and product oriented views there is 
nothing wrong with the aforementioned set of events. However, I claim that even if 
Gavin is successful in restoring Jessica’s garden, which he clearly owes to Jessica, what 
in fact is wrong with the situation is not the sole activity of Gavin destroying Jessica’s 
garden, but Gavin’s moral character of doing so on a bi-annual basis.36 In order to 
actually fix the situation and make things right, it is not sufficient that each time Gavin 
destroys Jessica’s garden he restores it, but in fact he must look at a bigger picture.37 
The restoration activity must also target Gavin’s moral character to successfully address 
the problem. It is important that restoration also involves the development of moral 
dispositions; it is only then that the problem of environmental degradation can be 
resolved. In other words, “[t]he practice of ecological restoration provides an important 
arena within which we can work out what it means to have a moral relationship with 
nature today” (Throop 2012, 47). Human population has caused severe environmental 
damage of which they are responsible for and ecological restoration responds to this 
challenge by forcing humans to re-evaluate their relationship with nature (Throop 2012, 
47).  
 
However there is a problem with my view of moral integrity and my example of Gavin 
and Jessica. Often the same people who do the damage are not actually the same people 
who restore. Ecological restorationists usually only repair the damage. Community 
restoration may often target the damage done by industry and companies. The people 
restoring are not actually the ones that did the damage. The link between the damage 
and restoration that is evident in my example of Gavin and Jessica is absent in most 
cases. Even though the person(s) who did the damage has the moral obligation to restore 
the damage, this does not mean that others should not take part. In fact public 
participation has potential to add positive value to restoration projects.  
 
Moral integrity only targets the human side of restoration, which is often left out by 
environmental philosophers. Moral integrity requires humans to develop their moral 
                                                            
36 This is similar to what John Basl argues in his essay “Restitutive Restoration: New Motivations for 
Ecological Restoration”. According to Basl, restitutive restoration is the answer to the “moral debt” that 
was caused by the environmental degradation. Environmental degradation demands for restitutive 
restoration. (See Basl, John (2010): “Restitutive Restoration: New Motivations for Ecological 
Restoration”. In Environmental Ethics. Volume 32, Issue 2. 135-147.) 
37 I shall argue for a wider perspective for restoration in the section “overall value”. 
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dispositions to ensure that environmental degradation does not happen again. It also 
targets the human relationship with nature. Human virtues play a significant role in 
moral integrity, which I will discuss in more detail in the section of values. Ecological 
restoration, as defined by SER, only tackles part of the problem that does not lie in 
nature, but lies within humans. I have found Light’s idea of humans, needing to restore 
their relationship with nature, very appealing. It emphasises the potential of restoration 
activity (also acknowledged by Higgs). According to Higgs, even though most goals for 
restorations are ecological, one very important goal of restoration should be to bring 
people to closer to nature and improve their relationship with nature (Higgs 2003, 115-
116). This means that cultural goals should also have a place in restoration
38
 (Higgs 
2003, 236). Reform of the moral integrity of humans will give room for the recognition 
that humans can be part of nature and have a shared history with ecosystems. In 
comparison, when looking at production systems this type of relationship is missing. An 
important way of delivering a sustainable solution to the bigger picture of the 
environmental crisis, is by scrutinising the moral realm of humans and the human 
relationship with nature. If we really value nature we need to go through an extensive 
transformation, on a mental and societal level. 
5.3. Values  
Values should be a fundamental part of restoration because they motivate and give 
justification to restoration projects. The reason why humans attempt to restore degraded 
ecosystems in the first place is because of the acknowledged values that have been lost 
which restoration attempts to amend. If humans did not regard the predisturbance 
system as valuable why restore it? Values then give justification for the restoration 
goals and also justify the means that are appropriate. Moral arguments should play a 
crucial part in the goal selection if we feel that we have a duty to restore. Facing an era 
of ecological degradation, ecological restoration appears to be a lot more than just the 
appropriate thing to do, in fact, “it feels like something we ought to do”, in addition, it 
makes us reflect on the human place in relation to nature (Throop 2012, 50-51).
39
 
                                                            
38 Terms such as ecocultural restoration which amalgamate ecology and culture, respond to the idea of 
man-nature relationship. According to Higgs, ecocultural restoration is appealing but it lacks the ability to 
go beyond those two aspects and take a stance on what counts as good ecological restoration. (Higgs 
2003, 226.) 
39 Restoration deals sufficiently with the issue of environmental degradation only if we manage to define 
the practice properly. I claim that malicious restoration or the restoration thesis fail to address this issue 
sufficiently. 
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Restoration promises to restore the site to its former glory. However, we must also 
remain sceptical and ask whether restoration is able to restore all the values that have 
been lost? If restoration fails to restore all the values, is it sufficient if at least some of 
the values are restored, if not all? As mentioned earlier, Elliot and Katz have rejected 
the idea that restoration could restore natural value. On the contrary, restoration appears 
to become a mockery of itself by producing fakes and artefacts. I agree with Elliot and 
Katz that this is a major concern that must be taken seriously. However, it is worth 
noting here that the value that Elliot and Katz are referring to is only one value among 
others. In other words, what is lost in restored ecosystems is only “one particular kind of 
aesthetic value” whilst other types of intrinsic value remain with the newly restored site 
which exhibits the connectedness with the original condition prior to human 
intervention (Attfield 1994, 119). The values that can be found in nature, according to 
Attfield are;  
 
intrinsic value of flourishing of the creatures which originate there, the value of intact ecosystems, and the 
value of human appreciation of wildness, of otherness, and of living systems which originate from 
evolution alone and lack any human modification (Attfield 1994, 119-120).  
 
Attfield points out that “only some of these values are distinctive of pure wilderness” 
whilst others like the flourishing of creatures can be found anywhere in the world both 
in wilderness and urban areas (Attfield 1994, 120). Indeed, according to Attfield, 
“restored wilderness”40 only lacks the last type of value, “living systems which originate 
from evolution alone and lack any human modification”. What Attfield is trying to 
show by this is that wildness of an area does not fully account for the value of nature, 
but there are other important values at play, and therefore, the value of wildness is not 
necessarily robust enough to turn down wilderness management proposals.
41
 In fact, 
Elliot did recognise this, and in Faking Nature he admits that there are other aesthetic 
values that contribute to the overall value of the place. However, he argues that 
naturalness, as a value adding property, can have a lot more significance compared to 
other values found in nature.
42
 I shall argue that value evaluation is a significant part of 
                                                            
40 As discussed in chapter 4.3., I believe this to be a contradictory term. 
41 In fact, Attfield writes that “much that is that is wild ought to be managed more than it is, including 
certain philosophical theories” (Attfield 1994, 120). 
42 See Elliot 1997, 42-73; 130-142. 
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restoration. This is obviously a challenging thing to carry out, but should be done in 
order to understand the true value of a place. The evaluation process should take into 
account all the values that were lost and all the values that can be restored. Furthermore, 
it should recognise that some values carry more weight than others. Many of the natural 
values such as species diversity, aesthetic beauty and ecological integrity can be 
restored. However, I do agree with Elliot and Katz that the value of pure wilderness – 
being evolved untouched by humans – is a natural value that resists restoration. This is a 
property that by definition cannot mix with humans. Due to its rareness
43
 it has 
significant amount of value. A good example to illustrate this is to compare the two 
cases used by Higgs, the value of Jasper National Park and Disney’s Wilderness Lodge. 
Which one would have more value if evaluated? Disney’s Wilderness Lodge is a hotel 
resort that simulates wilderness. It is completely man-made and its aim is to mimic 
wilderness. Disney’s Wilderness Lodge “may be unique but it is easily reproducible, its 
continuity depends on manufacturing narratives, and it is too new to have its own 
history” (Higgs 2003, 156). Jasper National Park on the other hand is a renowned 
National Park in Canada stretching over 4,000 square miles. It has a rich history and as 
an ecosystem is becoming rare due to human destruction. (Higgs 2003, 15-45.) In 
addition, Jasper National Park has a variety of natural values which are dependent on 
the history of the place. Jasper National Park cannot be replicated to several different 
locations whereas Disney’s wilderness lodge can be.44  
 
As we established earlier, natural values are not the only values that are significant for 
restoration but other values such as human participation are also important in 
determining the overall value of restoration projects. These values that are related to 
human action are linked to the goal of moral integrity discussed in the previous chapter. 
Values that target human agency can help protect restoration from turning into 
malicious restoration. In fact, Higgs emphasises how restoration is unique compared to 
other environmental management practices as restorations have the “potential to build 
value”. Firstly, restoration creates value in a neutral sense by restoring ecological 
                                                            
43 Is rareness a quality that should increase the value of a thing that is being valued? I do not think this is 
simple question and due to the scope of this thesis I will not be able to investigate it here. However, I will 
assume that rareness has significance when it comes to evaluation of natural areas.  
44 This raises the question whether older is better than new. Disney’s Wilderness Lodge is a new thing 
and needs time to create the sufficient history and narrative to grant its value. In a way this might seem 
unfair, but I believe this is exactly why wilderness areas are so valuable. Wilderness areas have the 
longest intact histories we are aware of expanding much further than any created landscape. 
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conditions that would have probably otherwise be lost. Secondly, restoration is able to 
create positive value on a communal or political level. The very decision to take action 
against environmental degradation by restoring damaged natural areas creates political 
value. Restoration also builds value through participation. However, it is the practice 
that determines whether restoration is in fact participatory. (Higgs 2003, 255-257.) 
These values that deal with human agency are particularly important and are completely 
ignored in the works of many philosophers including Elliot and Katz. The addition of 
these values can offer some compensation for the wild values that were lost. It is 
important to point out that these values are probably not great enough to justify 
destruction of wilderness, but provide a strong case to justify a restoration project (once 
the damage has already been done) over leaving the damaged ecosystem to its damaged 
state or building something novel on its place. Of course, these are all anthropocentric 
values but they should also be considered. In fact, these values have the opportunity to 
change human perception and relationship with nature from one dominated by control 
and destruction to one that is reciprocal and nurturing. In other words, these values have 
the potential to summon us back to the biotic community. 
  
In addition, restoration can add value by adding narrative to a place. Higgs writes, 
“[r]estorationists create stories through their actions, which accumulate and prepare the 
way for a richer interpretation of the place. The place grows in value precisely because 
of restoration.” (Higgs 2003, 157.) In fact the right type of narrative does not seem to 
disturb the naturalness of the place, on the contrary, it appears to give it more richness 
and depth. I will illuminate this with one of Higgs’ examples of Carmanah Valley on 
Vancouver Island which is the home of the largest trees on the planet. In 1980 the 
Carmanah Valley became the object of international protests due to the attempts to log 
the old growth forests. Fortunately the hard work of activists paid off which gave rise to 
Carmanah Wilderness Park. One of the activists Randy Stoltmann, a respected 
campaigner for wilderness preservation lost his life in an avalanche in 1994. After his 
death his friends campaigned for the Cathedral Grove, an ancient and endangered 
Douglas fir ecosystem on Vancouver Island, to be renamed the Randy Stoltmann 
Memorial Grove to commemorate his efforts towards the big trees. (Higgs 2003, 150.) 
In this example human agency and the narrative of Randy Stoltmann seems to add value 
to the place instead of damaging it. Higgs makes this point elegantly; 
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By making the grove a memorial, people have constructed a story about that place […] With each visit, 
each moment of pondering at the foot  of the giant Carmanah trees, the story grows thicker and the place 
develops greater significance […] His [Randy Stoltmann] memory is obviously graced by the dedication 
of the grove. I think the grove, too, is graced by his coexistence. It has taken on the character of a place, 
which will accord it special protection, and if need be in the future, the basis for meaningful restoration.  
(Higgs 2003, 150.) 
 
My question is, what kind of narrative would we leave behind if we chose not to restore 
a damaged ecosystem?
45
  
5.3.1. Healing metaphor 
I believe Throop’s healing metaphor is a useful metaphor to guide our moral 
considerations towards restoration. According to Throop, virtue ethics should play a 
large role in goal setting for restoration as it displays a variety of characteristics that are 
important in restoration. Throop argues that a healing metaphor seems best suited to 
address our moral considerations as well as ecological realities regarding restoration.
46
 
(Throop 2012, 51-52.) The virtues related to the healing metaphor are “humility, self-
restraint, sensitivity, and respect for the other” (Throop 2012, 48). A medical analogy is 
often put forward to exemplify the healing metaphor. The idea is that nature restores 
itself and humans only create the conditions in which healing can occur. Accordingly, 
goals are controlled by the restorationist’s understanding of what is good for the 
ecosystem and the focus is on the ecosystem not on the restorationist. In addition, the 
healing metaphor exemplifies a clear incentive – to heal, to make things right.47 Throop 
emphasises that the healing metaphor must be understood as “a moral metaphor, not an 
empirical metaphor” (Throop 2012, 54-55).48 As a moral metaphor it highlights “respect 
and care for the other, responsiveness to its situation, and limited control over the 
results” (Throop 2012, 53). The healing metaphor corresponds to certain virtues such as 
“humility, respect for the autonomy of the “patient” and a corresponding tendency to 
                                                            
45 More about narratives in environmental philosophy see O’Neill et al. (2008, 151-164).  
46 Throop lists three main metaphors that have been put forward for restoration. These are gardening, 
design, and healing. They all respond to different virtues and are suited to different contexts better than 
others. (Throop 2012, 51-52.) 
47 The healing metaphor emphasises the sense of duty which is missing in metaphors of design and 
gardening. In addition, gardening and design do not necessarily need a reason (Throop 2012, 54-55). 
48 The issue is that if the metaphor is taken literally it implies that ecosystems are like organisms which is 
not consistent with modern ecology. The aim is to provide moral guidance, not empirical or scientific 
evaluation. (Throop 2012, 54.)  
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restrain self-interest, and sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies of a system and its 
surroundings” (Throop 2012, 55). I shall discuss humility in more detail in chapter six. 
  
Self-restraint requires one to restrain one’s desires, that is, realising the limits to ones 
desires and recognising when it is sensible to stop instead of going forward. Self-
restraint, which is by no means a new virtue, is definitely a welcome virtue in current 
society dedicated to consumption. When negotiating restoration goals, especially when 
aiming to include public participation, it is important that the stakeholders embody self-
restraint. It is not uncommon for humans to try and achieve more than one is capable of. 
According to Throop, self-restraint resists the ecological services approach. Sensitivity 
highlights observation and requires the practitioner to be sensitive towards the patient’s 
individuality. The practitioner must listen to the patient and act accordingly. (Throop 
2012, 55-57.) The virtue is fitting in the case of ecosystems as each ecosystem is unique 
and restoration should demand sensitivity towards recognising the complexities and 
understand the most appropriate way to achieve recovery. These three virtues are well 
suited to guide restoration projects and the process of building a relationship with 
nature. The healing metaphor “seems to capture a primary moral motivation for all 
restoration projects: undoing a harm we have caused” (Throop 2012, 56). 
 
Humility, sensitivity and self-restraint correspond to conservative restoration goals. 
Historical continuity expresses humility, whereas large scale environmental 
manipulation (especially if creating a completely novel system) is likely to express 
hubris. Ecologists are often aware of the lack of knowledge, especially in the face 
climate change, where the category of uncertainties is becoming even more extensive. 
Returning an ecosystem back to predisturbance condition involves the lowest risk. 
(Throop 2012, 56-57.) After all, natural ecosystems exhibit two to three billion years of 
experience whereas human built environments cannot even get close to matching this, 
keeping in mind that ecological restoration as a practice properly emerged in the 
1980s.
49
  
 
                                                            
49 This type of  mistrust on human knowledge and capabilities can lead to what Eugene Hargrove 
describes as “environmental therapeutic nihilism”, which is the belief in the inevitable incompetence of 
science and using this as an attack against restoration  (see Hargrove, Eugene C. (1989): Foundations of 
Environmental Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall. 137-164). 
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However, environmental damage alone cannot count for our urge to restore. Destruction 
happens in nature everyday on different scales. For instance, volcanic eruptions, fires, 
the ice age to name a few, have all destroyed vast areas on the planet. Why does human 
caused destruction in particular call for restoration? Gunn emphasises that there is a 
distinction between natural destruction and human caused destruction in an ethical 
sense, for human caused destruction is a “matter of moral agency and responsibility”. 
He writes “[t]he landscapes of the American Southwest are “wrecked,”[…] To be 
wrecked is to be destroyed by a “wrecker””50. (Gunn 1991, 307-8.) I believe this is an 
extremely important point. Restoration and the values within it depend on a large part of 
on human action. We must not only look at the action of restoration but the actions that 
caused the degradation. These actions cause, within us, the willingness to restore. We 
react to the carelessness, disregard, cruelty, negligence and greed that have left a mark 
all over degraded landscapes. These vices all emerge in action. The difference between 
human caused destruction and natural destruction is that human caused destruction is 
done and natural destruction “merely happens”. Actions entail the possibility to do 
otherwise.
51
 Gunn argues that “we are, uniquely, responsible for environmental 
destruction” and this unique responsibility carries with it an obligation to avoid 
destruction and to restore some of the damage where possible. (Gunn 1991, 308.) Gunn 
agrees with Elliot that there really is a fundamental difference in the value of human 
caused environments and natural environments. However, Gunn argues that this 
difference in value does not spring from the “inherent and necessary qualitative 
difference” between the human created and natural environments. In fact, Gunn believes 
that the value difference lies in the moral responsibility that follows from human 
actions. (Gunn 1991, 308.) However, I believe that both Gunn and Elliot are seeing only 
one side to this issue. Ecological restoration is more complicated than this. I believe that 
Elliot makes an important point about genesis and history. Humans care about how 
things come about and Elliot has managed to show that origin does matter. At the same 
time Elliot does not really look into the spectrum of human activity that accompanies 
restoration, but concentrates only on the negative aspects of human action. As he 
believes human action is by definition non-natural.  
                                                            
50 A term used by Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), in the Sand County Almanac (1998). 
51 This point takes us to the difficult issue of free will. If humans do not have free will, as determinists 
believe, one cannot choose otherwise and cannot be responsible for their actions. Due to the scope of this 
thesis I shall not consider these issues here and will assume that we are responsible for our actions, 
whether we have free will or not. 
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I argue that human action plays a key role in restoration in three ways. (1) Immoral 
human action leads to environmental destruction, (2) the way and manner we restore is 
dependent on human action and (3) what defines the success of a restoration project is 
our actions in the future. Have we learned to live sustainably or in the harmony with 
ecosystems? Interestingly in philosophy human action is seen as something that should 
not mix with nature. I believe this roots in the unfortunate fact that human actions have 
mostly been harmful and destructive towards our ecosystems. However, it would be a 
mistake to think that human action is necessarily always harmful. There are several 
counterexamples to this claim. Let me present one of the Havsupai tribe.  
5.3.2. Case study – I am the Grand Canyon 
I would like to consider the case of an indigenous Indian tribe living in the Grand 
Canyon National Park in America. I believe there are many lessons to be learnt from 
lifestyles and philosophies of indigenous people. They offer Westerners a new, fresh 
and alternative perspective to the human-nature relationship.  
 
Over seven centuries the Havasupai people have lived in the plateaus of Northern 
Arizona. They form a small Indian reservation with a special connection to a place, the 
Grand Canyon. The Havasupai take good care of their lands and treat it with respect 
with a long-lasting goal to live there “as long as there should be Havasupai”. (Hirst 
2011, 1.) The Havasupai people, as many other indigenous people, see humans as being 
part of nature (Hirst 2011, xiv). In 1882 Europeans came along and claimed the land 
and restricted the Havsupai tribe to the Havasu Canyon reducing the size of the 
Havasupai’s lands from three million acres to 518 acres for a tribe more than three 
hundred people. (Hirst 2011, 1-2.) The setting of the reservation in 1882 forced the 
Havasupai to change their “whole survival pattern”. During the summers the Havasupai 
grew food with winter transforming the “lush oasis to a barren place of confinement”.52 
(Hirst 2011, 20-22.) I believe this excerpt shows the radically different way that the 
Indians perceive nature compared to Westerners: 
                                                            
52 Due to the lack of sunlight between November to March agricultural practices had to be given up. 
Because of the harsh conditions during winter time the Havasupai used to leave the canyon to their winter 
residence on the plateau. During the winter the Havasupai switched from agriculture and from a 
vegetarian diet to hunter and gatherers. This tradition continued until 1975, when the plateau was taken 
from them. The reduction of the Havasupai reservation forced the Havasupai to purchase food from the 
tribal shore. (Hirst 2011, 20-22.) 
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“Nature, even in this harsh place, affords survival but with care and understanding. The Havasupai 
bitterly resented the public hunting allowed by the Arizona Game and Fish Department within the 
Havasupai grazing permit areas on forest service land. They saw haygu (outsider) hunters take the deer of 
the land without proper respect for them. A Havasupai huntsman is no killer; he is a brother to his quarry 
and takes from need only what comes to him. All the animals must be able to flourish and multiply.” 
(Hirst 2011, 29.) 
 
The difference is made even clearer in the National Park Service public hearings on the 
Master Plan on 18
th
 May 1971, where Indian Chairman Lee Marshall started by 
declaring: “I heard all you people talking about the Grand Canyon. Well you’re looking 
at it. I am the Grand Canyon!” (Hirst 2011, 207.) 
 
The case of the Havasupai tribe and their quest to claim back their land serves as a great 
counterexample against the European idea of the human place in the world.
53
 Lee 
Marshall’s demand for justice and for recognition of being part of the Grand Canyon’s 
biotic community is a strong reminder for the Western civilisations that one can develop 
a deep relationship with nature and in fact become part of it. I claim that this deep sense 
of belonging to a place can have very sustainable and ethical consequences. What 
current Western societies tend to lack is a similar strong connection to a place, and this 
strong connection brings with it knowledge of the environment.
54
  The big difference is 
that the Havasupai tribe like many other indigenous people are part of the ecosystem 
whereas most, if not all, Western societies are not, but simply live of the ecosystem. If 
you remove the Havasupai you remove a critical part of the Grand Canyon. The reason 
why the Havasupai people are part of the ecosystem and do not appear to harm the 
naturalness of the national park is because of their actions, the way they live. They live 
out of respect for their surroundings; they live and believe that they are members of the 
biotic community and thus act like members of the community. Chief Luther Standing 
Bear (1998, 201–206) writes that Indians did not perceive nature as wild. For them 
nature was a home and was tame. All other species such as wolves and bears were not 
considered any different from humans, but were part of the same community. By 
                                                            
53 In addition, the case of the Havasupai tribe serves as an important reminder towards the belief that 
America was untouched wilderness before the European invasion. For instance, ancient irrigation ditches 
can be found around in the Grand Canyon dating back to many centuries before the first European visit. 
(Hirst 2011, 6.) 
54 Old members of the tribe are valued most for their skills and knowledge of the place and plateau 
“botany”. (Hirst 2011, 13-15; 29.) 
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contrast Western societies did not and do not identify themselves as part of nature and 
rarely, if ever, associate themselves as part of the ecosystem they live in. Interestingly, 
Western societies have mainly defined nature as something outside humans (see Nash 
1982).  
 
In the beginning of the Common Era wilderness was considered a scary and detestable 
place where evil lurked. Wilderness came to symbolise vice and evil. However, certain 
hermit monks and monasteries treated wilderness as a refuge from the evil world. In 
general, the attitudes towards wilderness used to be negative. (Nash 1982, 8–22.) In 
1800 American transcendentalism took a turn for the praising the beauty of nature 
which was fuelled by nostalgia. (Nash 1982, 77; 96–100.) In addition, one of the main 
goals of the Enlightenment – the era of “intellectual and cultural liberation” – appears to 
have been the domination of nature executed with scientific investigation and human 
reason. However, it is important to stress that this domination does not originate from 
“sheer human imperialism”, but is fuelled by “the aim of liberating humanity from 
disease, hunger, and toil, and of enriching life with learning, art, and athletics”. 
(Borgmann 1984, 36.)  
 
When comparing the Havasupai tribe and let say London, there appears to be a clear 
difference in their naturalness and the lifestyles of these societies. Western societies are 
dependent on large scale production systems, whereas the Havasupai tribe is dependent 
on the Grand Canyon ecosystem. It appears that these very different ideas of nature may 
have caused human societies to live very different kind of lives. This is obviously a very 
complicated observation and due to its complexity I will not be able to examine it here. 
However, I believe it is useful for my current purposes to emphasise this difference in 
the lifestyle and understanding of nature, as it gives context to my enquiry of 
restoration. I claim that the reason why Western societies are not part of nature is 
because the way they act, the way they live. They live of the world and not in the world. 
I will look at human action more closely in the next section and will return to this issue 
in the conclusion. 
5.4. Means 
I have read many definitions of what is a conservationist, and written not a few myself, but I suspect that 
the best one is written not with a pen, but with an axe. It is a matter of what a man thinks about while 
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chopping, or while deciding what to chop. A conservationist is one who is humbly aware that with each 
stroke he is writing his signature on the face of his land. Signatures of course differ, whether written with 
axe or pen, and this is as it should be. (Leopold 1966, 68.) 
 
In this section I shall look at the process, the human actions that are involved in 
restoration. I believe the passage written by Aldo Leopold (1887–1948) shows the 
importance of human action in environmental philosophy. Ultimately ecological 
restoration is about action. Leopold admits that he finds himself unsettled when 
analysing the work of his own axe and when analysing his own work he has found that 
“not all trees are created free and equal” (Leopold 1966, 68). He goes into a lengthy 
analysis behind his bias to cut a birch to save a white pine when managing his forest. He 
goes into detail on their ecological characteristics, their qualities, and what other species 
they might attract and what weaknesses they might have (Leopold 1966, 68-72). He 
concludes that even though he loves all trees he is “in love with pine […] and, as in 
other love affairs, there is skill in the exercise of bias” (Leopold 1966, 69). I believe this 
is an important realisation. When dealing with natural value we are dealing with painful 
decisions of saving indigenous species over exotic species, favouring certain species 
over others. This is the painful truth Leopold has managed to encapsulate – restoration 
is ultimately about sacrifice. What is important here is what we think whilst we restore 
– what are our ethical and rational justifications for these painful compromises. 
 
Setting goals for restoration is of great importance, however, it is often not the goals 
that cause the most debate among the restorationists, but the means through which to 
achieve them. How much human involvement is appropriate? Does this vary from one 
project to another? Does the nature of involvement matter? It is important to determine 
how much and what type of human action and participation is appropriate. After all, 
there are great differences between restoration projects. For instance, in some projects 
natural forces and techniques are used such as fire and most of the work is done by 
hand. Other projects are highly technical and use the latest technological equipment. 
Some projects include volunteers and others are conducted solely by the restoration 
professionals. It is the large variety of means that often blurs the validity of restoration.  
 
According to Higgs, and I agree, that one of the key elements of a restoration process 
should be public participation, because it ensures longevity and durability of restoration 
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projects (Higgs 2003, 122). According to Higgs, an ecological restoration project is 
successful only if the “human community is changed to reflect the health of the restored 
ecosystem” (Higgs 2003, 223). Higgs’ idea highlights a mutual relationship with our 
environments which involves the inclusion of cultural practices (Higgs 2003, 223). 
However, the type of human engagement with nature is crucial for the success of the 
restoration. Higgs insists that human engagement must be through focal practices 
(Higgs 2003, 223; 225-259). The aspect of human engagement makes restoration unique 
compared to other types of environmental management practices as engagement creates 
the “potential to build value” (Higgs 2003, 255). For Higgs, restoration is able to build 
value in two ways: firstly, in a neutral sense by restoring the ecological conditions that 
would otherwise be lost, and secondly, by creating positive value. For instance, the very 
decision to take action against environmental degradation by restoring damaged natural 
areas creates positive political value. Also public participation creates positive value. It 
is the practice that determines whether restoration is in fact participatory. However, it is 
important to remember that participation is only a potential aspect of restoration. 
Commitment is required to ensure that the restoration consists of focal practices
55
 and 
community-based involvement. (Higgs 2003, 255-258.)  
 
A distinction must be made between the product and the process. One option would be 
to claim that even though the restoration process, or the means that we take when 
restoring an area, involves a variety of intentional human actions, the process does not 
necessarily strip the end product of its status as natural. However, if origin is an 
important part of wilderness or nature then we cannot ignore the process (O’Neill et al. 
2008, 141). However, it is important to remember that fixing is not the same as creating 
something new. This claim is consistent with Gunn’s argument and Helena Siipi 
conditions for artefactuality. Restoration is fixing with a slight proportion of creating. 
For instance, if I fix a car I cannot claim that I have made that car. Someone else has 
made it and I have only fixed it. Or if I find a wounded animal and I nurture it to health, 
I have not created that animal. After I have healed the wounded animal we do not tend 
to think that the animals’ origin is human, human intervention might have been 
                                                            
55 Focal practices will be defined and discussed in the next section. 
66 
 
involved, but the animal is still natural.
56
 Humans do not have this “so called” magic 
touch that turns everything into artefacts, as Katz seems to be claiming. Nevertheless, 
the creation of novel ecosystems would be the case of creating artefacts. It is important 
to remember that artefactuality is a characteristic that can fade if not maintained.  
 
I will take a closer look at action. What does it tell us about humans if we destroy nature 
and let it be? As is known by ethical theorists, not doing is doing. Should we stay away 
and watch the ecosystems breakdown or should we do whatever we can to remedy the 
situation? My question is: ‘what does it tell about us if we chose not to restore’? 
5.4.1. Albert Borgmann’s Device Paradigm  
Albert Borgmann, an American philosopher, has developed an idea of a device 
paradigm which is a framework aimed to elucidate a pattern of technology present in the 
Western society. In Nature by Design (2003) Higgs uses Borgmann’s device paradigm 
to frame restoration in a larger context taking in to consideration the nature of modern 
technology, its role in society, the patterns that it produces and how it affects 
restoration. I believe Borgmann’s device paradigm is quite fitting to frame the debate of 
ecological restoration as it places it in larger context. This type of framing is what is 
needed in the debate. After all, the issues underlying environmental degradation are 
influenced by the increasingly technological human way of life. Technology enables 
humans to do more damage that would otherwise be possible. 
 
I will take a closer look at Borgmann’s device paradigm. Borgmann’s theory is part of 
philosophy of technology and is aimed at elucidating a unique pattern in modern 
societies which supersedes things and activities of great significance with commodities. 
According to Borgmann, the problems of technological societies tend to be external to 
technology and focus on politics, social issues and the environment instead of 
technology. (Borgmann 1984, 3.) He writes; 
 
I propose to show that there is a characteristic and constraining pattern to the entire fabric of our lives. 
This pattern is visible first and most of all in the countless inconspicuous objects and procedures of daily 
life in a technological society. (Borgmann 1984, 3.) 
                                                            
56 Obviously if I have replaced the animal's leg with a bionic leg, instead of letting it heal naturally, we 
can say the naturalness of the animal is partly challenged. But this again boils down to action, what 
methods I decide to use when taking care of the wounded animal. 
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Part of the success of technology is its promise to liberate and enrich human lives. 
However, this promise can only be delivered, if the products of technology are 
available. Availability is the key for the construction of the device paradigm. According 
to Borgmann, something is available if it is instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy. 
Borgmann illustrates this point with an example of a commodity – warmth. He uses an 
example of a wood-burning stove in contrast to a central heating system to illustrate his 
point. Warmth has not always been instantaneous and ubiquitous. To make a house 
warm a hundred years ago involved work, effort and skill. The background involved 
felling trees, cutting, splitting and stacking of firewood, starting the fire and maintaining 
it. In contrast acquiring warmth via a central heating system requires minimal effort. 
One only needs to turn the system on by turning the switch on. Warmth did not use to 
be ubiquitous either. A wooden stove or a fire place does not provide heat evenly, 
whereas a central heating system can be set to achieve the exact desired temperature for 
the entire house. A wooden stove is not particularly safe as one can hurt themselves 
whilst chopping fire wood or burn themselves when starting the fire or even worse, burn 
the entire house down. A central heating system is much safer in comparison. Finally, 
acquiring warmth with fire is not easy, as it needs to be maintained and all the tasks 
involved (knowing the characteristics of different types of wood, cutting trees, starting 
the fire and maintenance) requires a certain level of skill. On the other hand, a central 
heating system does not require skill. Borgmann defines skill as “intensive and refined 
world-engagement”, interwoven with social engagement which contributes and shapes a 
person’s character. (Borgmann 1984, 40-42.)  
 
Borgmann makes a distinction between things and devices. A thing, for Borgmann, “is 
inseparable from its context” (Borgmann 1984, 42). This context includes human 
engagement with the thing and its world. The engagement with a thing and its context is 
always both physical and social engagement. Due to the richness of the thing’s context, 
a thing provides more than one commodity. For example, a stove is used to provide 
more than mere warmth, it was the centre of the house, marked the time of day 
(coldness marked the morning, warmth beginning of a new day) and it provided the 
family members with different tasks. (Borgmann 1984, 42.) A device on the other hand 
only provides the commodity it is designed for. The “burdensome” elements of a thing 
are taken over by the machinery of the device, thereby stripping it from world 
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engagement. Devices tend to become easier to use whilst the device’s machinery 
becomes more complicated and simultaneously more concealed. (Borgmann 1984, 41-
43.) 
 
Borgmann emphasises the interesting distinction in the means-ends relationship of 
devices. Normally means are “subservient” to the end, and therefore, one cannot change 
the means without doing damage to the end. Interestingly, this does not appear to apply 
to technological devices. With devices, the means can be changed drastically without 
risking the “identity and familiarity of the function of the device” (Borgmann 1984, 
43).
57
 Borgmann describes the means-ends relationship as follows; 
  
This concomitance of radical variability of means and relative stability of ends is the first distinguishing 
feature. The second, closely tied to the first, is the concealment and unfamiliarity of the means and the 
simultaneous prominence and availability of the ends. […] A commodity is truly available when it can be 
enjoyed as mere end, unencumbered by means. (Borgmann 1984, 43-44.)  
 
This defining feature of the device parading causes anonymity. In a world of things, 
nature and culture are entwined together. This complicated mix of relationships is 
missing in devices, where technology has taken over the means causing anonymity.
58
 
Devices fail to inspire engagement with the world and only invite to enjoy the mere end 
devoid of context. In other words, there is a wide gap between the means and the ends 
of a device. (Borgmann 1984, 44.) 
 
Higgs is concerned that the reach of the device paradigm will end up turning restoration 
into a commodity, which in turn would convert ecosystems into commodities (Higgs 
2003, 180). Higgs describes the device paradigm as follows; 
                                                            
57 Borgmann illustrates his point with an example of a watch. No one tends to get confused between a 
mechanically built watch that is powered by springs and where time is indicated by a dial and pointers 
and an electronic watch powered by a quartz crystal and where time is shown digitally. (Borgmann 1984, 
43) 
58 To exemplify this Borgmann uses an example of George Sturt, one of the last wheelrights experiencing 
the shift from the pretechnological society to a technological society. Borgmann paraphrases Sturt’s 
experiences of the emerging device paradigm. Sturt highlights how a wheelrights profession requires 
engagement with the world including a variety of knowledge and skill. A wheelright needs to know what 
type of timber to cut and when to cut it. However, this relationship between the wheelright and timber 
was “not of domination but mastery” (Borgmann 1984, 44). In fact, a wheelright is able to find new 
dimensions and characteristics in the timber he works with that would otherwise remain hidden. The 
device paradigm on the other hand removes skill replacing it with “mechanical power”, thus causing 
anonymity by stripping the commodity of the knowledge and skill of its maker. (Borgmann 1984, 44-47.)   
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There is a slow, inexorable drift in society, whether through themed hotels that purport to mirror 
wilderness or technologically dependent leisure activities, to convert everything of value into something 
that can be bought or sold. The problem is that there are things that mean more to us than mere currency. 
(Higgs 2003, 180.) 
 
Borgmann’s device paradigm is an interesting and critical analysis of human societies. 
The western culture appears to give a technological twist to everything.
59
 What is in the 
spotlight here is not really the individual technologies, but the relationships between 
people and technology (Higgs 2003, 184). Pointing out the device paradigm, Higgs is 
aiming to show that restoration is facing a major conceptual shift that affects our 
understanding of it. New “commodity-driven technological approaches” are challenging 
the more hands-on practices that restoration used to rely on. (Higgs 2003, 181.) The 
professionalisation of restoration accompanied by technically proficient techniques 
serving corporate goals might be signs of the device paradigm’s grip on restoration. 
However, what is an important aspect of restoration is the restoration of the human-
nature relationship which is something that is completely ignored by the highly 
professionalised technological restoration. Higgs defines two types of restoration, 
technological restoration (interlinked to the technological culture which is the product 
of the device paradigm) and focal restoration (based on building relationships between 
people and ecosystems).
60
 (Higgs 2003, 185-186.)  
 
What creates meaning in our lives according to Borgmann, are the interconnections 
between a person, a thing, and the environment. Such things that create meaning in our 
lives Borgmann calls focal practices. Focal things are made by focal practices which 
require attention and are aimed at learning a skill that can be developed leading to 
competence and excellence. (Borgmann 1984 196-210; Higgs 2003, 185-186, 190-191.) 
Learning to play a musical instrument or cooking, are good examples of focal practices. 
Higgs emphasises that “[f]ocal practices teach us lessons of fidelity and commitment” 
(Higgs 2003, 191). Recognising restoration as a focal practise is also a critical 
evaluation of contemporary society. It is to acknowledge that some areas in society 
                                                            
59 This is, what I believe, Elliot and Katz are objecting to when it comes to human culture and what 
human action could do to nature. 
60 I believe Borgmann’s technological restoration to be consistent with Light’s malicious restoration and 
focal restoration with benevolent restoration. 
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allow destruction of places that are valued. Ultimately technology is unsuccessful at 
liberating us from chores and providing happiness, because technology distracts us from 
pursuing focal things. (Borgmann 1984, 196-210; Higgs 2003, 188-195.) Higgs sees the 
device paradigm as a pattern where “[t]radition is replaced by the consumption of 
tradition” (Higgs 2003, 183). The question arises “[w]hat will restorationists of the 
future restore: things or devices, reality or hyperreality” (Higgs 2003, 206)?  
5.5. Overall attitude 
Analysing ecological restoration systematically through the categories of goals, values 
and means reveals how each of these categories plays a vital role in contributing to our 
understanding of restoration. As Higgs writes, “[e]cological restoration is a process as 
much as a product, aimed at assisting the recovery of whole ecosystems” (Higgs 2003, 
124). Analysing restoration through these categories shows that if restoration is defined 
carefully, it avoids or responds to the main criticisms raised against restoration. 
Therefore, it has the potential to be an important mechanism in our search to live more 
harmoniously with nature. The analysis also reveals that restoration is ultimately about 
action, and actions are under the scrutiny of ethics, in other words, it matters how we 
restore. If done right – goals and means are consistent with our values –restoration has 
great potential to demonstrate that humans can be part of nature and can coexist with 
natural environments. There need not be a strict duality.  
 
Here I will argue that our overall attitude of restoration should be considered in larger 
context. Values and goals should feed into the overall attitude of restoration. 
Appropriate means of restoration should be evaluated and on a project-by-project basis 
nevertheless ensuring that actions involved are consistent with the goals, values and 
overall attitude of restoration.
61
 As a model for the overall attitude for restoration I will 
use Paul Hirsch’s and Bryan Norton’s model that urges us to “think like a planet”. Paul 
Hirsch is an assistant Professor of environmental policy and Bryan Norton is a Professor 
of philosophy who has contributed widely on environmental philosophy. Facing climate 
change Hirsch and Norton’s model is tackling the need for new mental models on 
                                                            
61 For instance, restoration projects in considerably wild areas should involve minimal human 
involvement, whereas restoration of rural or ecocultural landscapes often require human intervention and 
practices. The overall attitude, values and goals help determine whether an ecocultural site should be 
restored to predisturbance state prior to any human involvement or to a predisturbance state before the 
negative human impact.  
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personal and cultural scales. However, I shall use the model in the context of restoration 
as new mental models are also required to aid us to comprehend restoration on a global 
scale.  
 
Hirsch and Norton argue that the search should begin with “our mental models –our 
conceptual frameworks and “maps” of the “reality” we act within”62 (Hirsch and Norton 
2012, 317). In order to act virtuously in the changing world we must adjust our 
conceptual frameworks. Acting virtuously is not only about embracing behaviour 
patterns that are consistent with our morality or our sense of what is right, but 
adjustments must be made to our “understanding of the spatial and temporal context in 
which action takes place” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 317). According to Hirsch and 
Norton, a significant mental shift is required to understand the context of our moral 
actions. A “metaphor-driven cognitive transformation” is the best way to comprehend 
this shift, and a well-chosen metaphor will match the scale of the system one is dealing 
with. In the context of climate change Hirsch and Norton suggest that the new context 
of our actions should be “the planet as a whole”. Therefore, we must learn how to think 
like a planet. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 317-318.) I believe restoration is also a global 
issue and therefore thinking like a planet is a suitable context to guide our overall 
attitudes towards restoration.  
 
The cognitive shift must happen on both an individual and societal level (Hirsch and 
Norton 2012, 319-326). The individual and societal shift in mental models will 
encourage new institutions to emerge that will promote the metaphor “think like a 
planet”. However, the new institutions do not necessarily “need to replace existing 
structures and processes, but rather involve added “layers” that complement existing 
institutions and structures, organised in polycentric patterns” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 
318-319). I shall spend some time looking at the individual and societal transformations 
that are needed if we were to think like the planet. 
 
Hirsch and Norton use a case study to illustrate the type of mental shift that must occur 
if we wish to live virtuously in the changing world. A great example of this type of 
                                                            
62 “A “mental model” can be understood as an internal representation of how something works in the 
world; how different dynamics are interrelated; and how a person’s actions and experience shape and are 
shaped by those dynamics (see Doyle and Ford 1998 and Johnson-Laird 2000)” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 
332). 
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cognitive shift is that of Aldo Leopold and the cognitive shift he went through when 
managing wildlife populations in southwest of United States.
63
 By trial and error 
experimentation Leopold learnt the “importance of the spatial and temporal scale at 
which a given problem is addressed […] In his essay “Thinking like a Mountain,” 
Leopold (1966) provided a metaphorical guide to re-modelling a problem at a new scale 
– the scale of the mountain” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 318). Leopold’s early interests 
were focused on safeguarding the economic viability of the wildlife landscapes. He 
wanted to ensure that there was enough deer to attract hunters. As the main predators 
were wolves, Leopold came to the simple conclusion that less wolves meant more deer. 
Unknown to him this management decision put in motion a chain of events which led to 
the decline of the deer population and the ecological qualities of the entire landscape.
64
 
Leopold was using the metaphor of nature as a productive system which primary goal is 
to maximise the productivity of the desired items. His experimentation with the 
predation interaction between deer and wolves lead to the discovery of a much larger 
ecological system which exhibited interrelationships to which Leopold had previously 
been blind to. In addition, this ecological system was also embedded in a much bigger 
geological system that worked on a much slower pace and included other important 
natural processes. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 319-320.) This discovery is encapsulated in 
the following sentence in his essay, “only the mountain has lived long enough to listen 
objectively to the howl of a wolf”65 (Leopold (1966), 129; Hirsch and Norton 2012, 
320). Hirsch and Norton argue that Leopold failed to recognise the “the spatial and 
temporal context in which his actions were relevant” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 319). 
This lack of vison meant that he failed to reach his intended goals and also was blind to 
values inherent in the landscape which he then completely ignored. This failure to see 
the bigger picture resulted in a “shift in the core metaphor” and led to the discovery of 
the biosphere, a larger system we all depend on. Leopold’s case exemplifies that 
individuals can under right circumstances (with enough vision and with sufficient 
                                                            
63 It is important to stress that the cognitive shift Leopold went through was not common in Leopold’s 
time and it therefore highlights the viability that such a drastic change in one’s mental model can happen. 
Leopold argued for a land ethic, which was a completely novel way of interpreting the human nature 
relationship at the time when anthropocentric world view was the norm. Sadly still today 
anthropocentrism dominates environmental management and politics. 
64 First occurred a sudden increase of deer populations which in turn resulted in overgrazing which 
resulted in loss of local vegetation. This meant that there was not enough food to maintain the large 
amount of deer which led to big losses in deer populations. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 319.) 
65 Hirsch and Norton propose that the metaphor of a “mountain” could be easily be replaced by 
“ecosystem” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 320). 
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scientific knowledge) undergo a transformation in mental models, which are responsible 
for shaping ones reasoning. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 319-321.)  
 
The planet as a system is much larger and a lot slower compared to our economic or 
political systems. Political systems tend to function on relatively short time scales. For 
instance in Finland the parliamentary elections and municipal elections occur every four 
years, European Parliament elections every five years and presidential elections every 
six years. These time scales might feel long in human terms but are short if we thought 
like a planet. Economic metaphors of productivity are too simplistic and inadequate to 
match up to the reality and complexity of the world in which we operate (Hirsch and 
Norton 2012, 321). Metaphors are the foundation of models and models need to display 
“the relationships among human activities, greenhouse gases, and patterns of climate” 
(Hirsch and Norton 2012, 322).  
 
Individual transformation is not sufficient if we are looking to develop more sustainable 
environmental management. A transformation must also occur on a societal level. This 
type of cultural shift will require the implementation of “new cultural models”.66(Hirsch 
and Norton 2012, 318.) According to Hirsch and Norton, society wide transformations 
are more likely to occur if a given problem generates a new metaphor that frames and 
assists understanding the issue better compared to the old metaphor, thereby challenging 
old unfit models. This will encourage new institutions with new models to rise and 
respond to the challenge. The new cultural models must be connected to the 
development of new institutions which requires distributed cognition.  
 
Distributed cognition,
67
 refers to the idea of external representations, that is, 
representations taking place outside the human mind. External representations 
contribute to the thinking process. For instance, our way of thinking changes as soon as 
we extend our thinking to the external world. Counting with ones fingers, with numbers 
written on a piece of paper, with a calculator or a computer, all implicates interaction 
with a form a representation which in turn “facilitates thinking process”. (Hirsch and 
                                                            
66 “Cultural models are mental models that are shared by groups, making communication about shared 
values and goals possible” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 332). 
67 Distributed cognition is by no means a new phenomenon. Cognitive scientists, philosophers and 
sociology of science have researched cognition on a collective scale for many years. (Hirsch and Norton 
2012, 323.) 
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Norton 2012, 318-323.) Hirsch and Norton point out that “[a]ny discussion of what it 
means to think, the reasoning goes, is impoverished if it does not include the whole 
cognitive system of the thinker, his or her body, written symbols, technological 
instruments, and the relations among them” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 323). Hirsch and 
Norton illuminate the idea of distributed cognition with two examples. First, distributed 
cognition is involved when landing an airplane which exemplifies a complicated 
process that requires the integration of information and skills. Landing a plane involves 
pilots, cabin crew and air-traffic controllers and could not be done safely if only a single 
person was involved. The second example offered by Hirsch and Norton is a case of 
“interdisciplinary biomedical research laboratories”.68 (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 323-
324.) But compared to the two examples, the issue of environmental degradation and 
the globally suitable definition for restoration is a much bigger and more complex 
challenge.  
 
I believe that “thinking like a planet” serves as a useful metaphor that encapsulates the 
context and scale that is required. After all, ecological restoration is both 
interdisciplinary (“integration of different disciplines”) and transdisciplinary (“crossing 
the boundary between science and society”) (Huutoniemi 2010, 79-88). Philosophy, 
ecology or sociology alone could not satisfactorily define the concept. If the concept 
was defined by interdisciplinary efforts, it will also need to feed back to society. 
Therefore, “thinking like a planet” is a fitting metaphor to frame ecological restoration.  
 
There is however, an issue with the metaphor. Thinking like a planet may be or appear 
to be in conflict with other values, such as freedom, which we have fought for, died for 
and/or voted for. Therefore, many might be unnerved by the political implications of the 
metaphor. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 329-330.) To solve this problem Hirsch and Norton 
suggest that science, especially ecology and geology, can help us to think like a planet, 
however, “much of the social machinery for deciding, regulating, and enforcing 
decisions may be best off where it currently resides” (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 330). 
Another issue that must be raised is what the metaphor would say about the enormous 
size of the human population? Surely, if we thought like a planet, we should recognise 
                                                            
68 Based on the research of Nersessian, N., Kurz-Milcke E., Newstetter W. and Davies, J. (2003): 
‘Research Laboratories as Evolving Distributed Cognitive Systems’. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, (ed.) Aterman R., Kirsh D.. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum. 
857-862.  
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that we need to considerably reduce the human population. Would the metaphor permit 
unethical methods to achieve this? I believe both of these issues are only apparent. It is 
important to remember that it is only a metaphor aimed to guide and to frame our 
understanding of the world we live in. The metaphor is there to help us to see the bigger 
context of our actions and other important values or goals can override the metaphor as 
long as they are well justified. 
 
Higgs raises two important issues when defining restoration. Firstly, our beliefs change 
and with them so do definitions – “evolution, after all, acts on words as well as worlds” 
(Higgs 2003, 124). However, according to Higgs there are two principles that are 
capable of standing through the test of time – ecological integrity and historical fidelity 
(Higgs 2003, 124). I argue that thinking like a planet is a fitting metaphor to ensure that 
ecological integrity and historical fidelity do in fact continue to factor in restoration. 
Secondly, Higgs points out that restoration should be “locally enacted and globally 
sanctioned” (Higgs 2003, 224). Restoration happens on a local level involving local 
people but only has force if it is recognised and supported by a global community. 
Thinking like a planet addresses this requirement by acknowledging the uniqueness of 
ecosystems, but at the same time recognising that all ecosystems are ultimately 
connected into one big living system, planet Earth.  
5.6. Conclusion 
In this section I have intended to highlight further issues that might cause issues for the 
concept of restoration. I have also attempted to define restoration in a way that either 
escapes or answers the criticisms put forth by Elliot and Katz, who have argued that 
restoration is conceptually impossible as the outcome will inevitably be manmade and 
therefore, not natural. As I have argued in the previous chapters, their arguments rely on 
a definition of nature as wilderness. By redefining the concept of ‘nature’ in subchapter 
4.3., I attempted to remove the conceptual burden that ‘wilderness’ carries over to 
‘nature’. My aim was to remove the dichotomy between man and nature from the 
concept of nature to ‘wilderness’. Making this distinction allows human action, at least 
to a certain degree, back into nature. However, simultaneously I wanted to retain the 
feature of nature without man in the concept of wilderness, which remains as the sole 
area of conservation resisting human action.  
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Now that humans have been conceptually granted access to nature, restoration becomes 
possible. Still the issue remains; certain human actions appear more natural than others 
and humans can have a very harmful effect on ecosystems. Some human actions do not 
seem to fit nature without risking its status as natural. I suggested that the naturalness of 
human action depends on how the actions fit into the ecosystem(s). Actions done in 
harmony and in relation to other species and processes of the ecosystem count as 
natural. Many indigenous people would exemplify “natural” human behaviour. Western 
societies on the other hand, rely on production systems and live in environments filled 
with artefacts leaving very little room, if any, for spontaneous forces of nature. For 
instance, Holmes Rolston points out that when America was discovered by European 
explorers the American ecosystem was in a state of self-renewal, even though, Indians 
had lived there for a long time. I agree with Rolston’s point that whether humans are 
part of nature is ultimately a numbers game. Currently the human population might 
simply be too big to be part of nature, despite how much we would change the way we 
live.
69
 (Rolston 1998, 378.) I admit that my understanding of nature goes against the 
most traditional ways of understanding nature. I hope it will serve as a reminder and a 
challenge to inspect how nature is understood in Western societies. 
 
Reflecting on the section of means and Borgmann’s device paradigm, I argued that what 
ultimately makes humans non-natural is the manner we are moving away from focal 
things to devices. Living with focal things is natural (as long as it is done by respecting 
the environmental limits). It urges humans to engage with the world (both cultural 
human world and natural world) and creates meaning in human lives. The device 
paradigm turns focal things into devices, making them available and easy to consume 
thus prohibiting focal practices and limiting human skill and engagement with the 
world. In Borgmann’s words “[l]imitations of skill confine any one person’s primary 
engagement with the world to a small area” (Borgmann 1984, 42). The device paradigm 
is creating an artificial place which causes humans to disengage from their surrounding 
natural environment. Acting only in the world of devices is what makes human life non-
natural.  
 
                                                            
69 It is important to point out that Rolston argues for a strict dichotomy between humans and nature. 
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I have stressed the importance of restoration goals, values, means and the overall 
attitude towards our understanding of the concept restoration. I have identified three 
restoration goals: ecological integrity, historical fidelity and moral integrity. These 
goals resist malicious restoration and secure historical continuity with the past, restoring 
the natural processes (self-renewal) and are also aimed at restoring the human 
relationship with nature. In addition, metaphors such as the healing metaphor and 
‘thinking like a planet’ will ensure humble restoration on nature’s terms. Hence, I will 
define ecological restoration as follows: Ecological restoration is an intentional activity 
aiming to restore a damaged ecosystem back to a condition resembling the 
predestruction conditions by returning its ability for self-renewal. Restoration activity 
should be guided by the goals of ecological integrity, historical fidelity and moral 
integrity.   
 
Thinking like a planet will help to place nature in a bigger context of which humans and 
(at least certain parts of) human culture can be part of, without doing damage to its 
naturalness. Obviously the ontological status of human artefacts and the products of 
culture are human and therefore, differ from things that have come into being through 
natural processes. Yet this difference in origin does not necessarily exclude them from 
nature considered in a wider context. After all, culture is a defining aspect of humanity. 
Some artefacts are an essential part of human culture and human life and are therefore 
an essential part of human engagement with the world. It would be strange to merely 
allow human presence in nature yet prohibit human action. In a similar way beaver’s 
dams have a different ontological status, in that they have been built by beavers. 
Although beaver’s dams might not have been built intentionally.70 Nevertheless, the 
device paradigm and the metaphor ‘thinking like a planet’ will serve as useful tools for 
further investigation into the debate over the meaning of ‘nature’ and meaning of 
‘ecological restoration’. I believe restoration offers a great opportunity to start this task.  
6. Problems 
Now that I have attempted to a sketch a definition for ecological restoration, it is time to 
turn our attention to the possible problems that might arise with the concept of 
restoration I have put forth. 
                                                            
70 Due to the scope of this thesis I will not be able to take these arguments further. My aim is to point out 
that our understanding of nature still needs to be refined and developed.  
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6.1. The invisible threat - endocrine disrupting chemicals 
Next I would like to raise a particularly challenging environmental issue that not only 
poses a serious challenge to human societies but also creates challenges to our 
understanding of nature. We live in an excessively chemically saturated world in which 
chemicals have become a significant part of modern human life. There are currently 
around 87,000 chemicals in commercial use of which an unknown number are 
chemicals categorised as endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDC) (Vogel 2005, 277). 
EDC are chemical compounds which affect the endocrine systems (better known as the 
hormonal system) of mammals. EDC are chemical pollutants “with diverse physical and 
chemical properties” (M. F. Rahman, E. K. Yanful and S. Y. Jasim 2009, 224). The 
human endocrine system is in charge of regulating essential bodily functions, and in 
very small quantities, hormones control and affect these functions “ranging from 
gender differentiation during fetal development to the ‘adrenaline rush’ of extreme 
sports” (Vogel 2005, 277). EDC can occur naturally or are created by humans as 
synthetic chemical compounds. The issue with EDC that I am discussing deals with the 
latter.
71
  
 
The problem with EDC raises particular concern towards environmental ethics and the 
philosophy of ecological restoration due to EDC’s capability to change living organisms 
in a substantial way. What makes EDC particularly problematic is the fact that all these 
changes happen on a hormonal level and are not directly observable to the naked eye 
until the negative impact has already happened. Exposure to EDC often poses an 
indirect threat to ecosystems and human health because of the detrimental effects that 
can occur long after one has been exposed (European Commission, “Endocrine 
Disruptors”). With the aid of analytical science, scientists have been able to identify 
traces of wide range of chemical compounds in the environment. Various studies have 
shown that EDC have deleterious effects to both human and environmental health 
(Rahman et al. 2009, 225). Different effects that have been recorded to be caused by 
EDC are “reproductive infertility, sexual underdevelopment, altered or reduced sexual 
behavior, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, altered thyroid and adrenal cortical 
function, not to mention increased incidence of certain cancers and birth defects among 
                                                            
71 Chemicals do obviously also have beneficial effects and have improved human life. However, here I 
will focus on the possible negative impacts of some of these chemicals. 
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other effects
72 ” (Vogel 2005, 277). These micro-pollutants that were previously 
undetectable have been found in sewage treatment plant’s effluents and in the so-called 
clean drinking waters.
73
  
 
So how does this knowledge of EDC effect our attitudes towards nature and natural and 
towards restoration. To begin with this issue raises a new almost invisible challenge to 
restoration. Due to severe effects of these micro-pollutants, we should not restrict 
restoration projects only to the very apparent and perceptible damage, but restoration 
should also aim to clean-up these imperceptible pollutants. Vogel writes that EDC lead 
to “unnatural, untimely, and perhaps excessive release or suppression of hormones, a 
phenomenon known as endocrine disruption”74 (Vogel 2005, 277). Does this mean that 
EDC turn animals and plants into artefacts? By using Helena Siipi’s definition of an 
artefact, the answer would be no. Artefactuality requires intentionality and intentionality 
is completely missing here. If they are not artefacts are they non-natural? To answer this 
question I shall adopt a reply Elliot uses against climate change. In Faking Nature Elliot 
contemplates whether nature is turning non-natural due to climate change as a human 
caused phenomenon. Elliot argues that the case of climate change “is a case of natural 
response to a non-natural stimulus”. (Elliot 1997, 127.) Even though humans may be 
intentionally and sometimes less intentionally realising the vast amount of CO2 into the 
atmosphere, the way ecosystems respond to this is a natural response to a non-natural 
cause. If natural process can still work autonomously the thing can be called natural. 
However, as established earlier naturalness occurs in degrees, and similarly organisms 
that have been affected by EDC might not embody the full spectrum of natural value 
due to these chemical pollutants, yet they would still count as natural. The organisms 
affected by EDC are natural organisms responding to a non-natural stimulus. It is 
therefore, our duty to aim to reconsider whether producing these chemicals with 
unprecedented effects is a sensible thing to do and we should also attempt clean up 
these chemicals from ecosystems where possible. 
                                                            
72 See Howdeshell, 2002; McLachlan and Arnold, 1996; Zoeller, 2002. 
73 EDC have been found to have particularly adverse effects in fish, such as feminization in Rainbow 
trout where the male fish start producing female eggs and hormones (Purdom et al., 1994). Also 
mascilinization and sterility have been found (see Howell et al.,1980; Sumpter 2005; Orlando & Guillette 
2007). In humans, “early onset of puberty in girls, delayed puberty in boys and impaired fertility in men” 
have been found. (see Sharpe & Irvine 2004; Snyder et al. 2005; Colon et al. 2000). (Rahman et al. 2009, 
230-231.) 
74 My emphasis. 
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6.2. De-extinction – restoring extinct species 
De-extinction is a closely related and overlapping issue to ecological restoration. It also 
serves as a great example as it further tests our understanding of origin, nature, the 
appropriate role of human agency and creates new opportunities for restoration projects. 
De-extinction is the process of bringing already extinct animal species back to life by 
using the developments of modern biotechnology. Contemporary biotechnology aims to 
bring back species we thought were lost forever by using the DNA of the extinct species 
often extracted from preserved specimens such as preserved or found carcasses.
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Genetic engineering technologies can be used to repair or reconstruct the extracted 
DNA. The next stage then involves cross-species cloning. The reassembled DNA is 
inserted to egg of a host species that is genetically closest or close enough to serve as a 
surrogate mother. Sometimes further breeding might be necessary to enhance certain 
features. (Revive and Restore: “What “Genetic Rescue” Means”.) 
 
There are several species, such as the passenger pigeon and woolly mammoth, that are 
targets of de-extinction projects. There are also projects where the aim is to bring extinct 
ecosystems back to life (Revive and Restore). The history of these extinct species is 
being re-written and their existence as a species re-created. Is de-extinction taking 
restoration to another level or is it a completely different and unrelated field? The 
Revive and Restore
76
 website describes de-extinction as genetic conservation – is this 
an oxymoron, can something that has become extinct be conserved? I will analyse what 
de-extinction entails and whether it could be counted as a form of restoration. 
 
Gunn criticises the possibility of de-extinction. He states de-extinction would be along 
the following lines; 
 
Could it be that a species was a class with members at time T1, and was a class without members (or null 
class) at a later time T2, and was caused to be a class with members at a still later time T3?77 (Gunn 1991, 
298.)  
                                                            
75 For example woolly mammoth DNA has been successfully extracted from a specimen found in Siberia 
permafrost. 
76 A hub aiming to coordinate, bring to together scientists working with genetic conservation and create 
public awareness of de-extinction technologies and opportunities. 
77 Gunn holds on to the view that species consist of individuals which then renders recreation of species 
logically impossible. However, in his article “The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments” he 
takes a more conventional approach on species and considers them as a class. Gunn admits that there exist 
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It appears that the word “extinct” retains a lot of information such as information about 
a species past, present and the future, that is, it used to exist, until the last member of the 
species died which means that it will forever remain a null class. This means that the 
species will never have any members in the future. This is the definition of “extinct” 
and how the concept has normally been perceived. (Gunn 1991, 299.) By definition 
extinction means that the species in question cannot be recreated. It is a logical 
impossibility to revive an extinct species. “An extinct species is one that has come to an 
end, has died out, is a permanently null class.” (Gunn 1991, 299.) According to Gunn, 
this definition is consistent with the everyday language and the scientific definition of 
extinction. Can we then recreate an extinct species? If we understand extinction as 
defined above the answer is no, as once a species has become extinct it is gone forever. 
This is what Gunn calls a “definitional stop”. (Gunn 1991, 299.) 
 
The pressing question here is: what are we reviving? Is it the genome or the species and 
is the genome and the species the same thing? Gunn considers three different options of 
how to define the existence of a species. Firstly, most people would agree that existence 
requires “spatiotemporal continuity”, which means that an actual individual exists and 
once the last individual has died the species becomes extinct. According to the second 
option, it is enough for a species to exist as long as some “physical material” exists, 
such as tissue. According to the third requirement, as long as genetic information of the 
species exists the species exists. The last sense is the broadest. Gunn points out that 
there is something rather strange about the fact that “the extinction of a species could 
occur at the moment the disk file is erased”.78 (Gunn 1991, 301.) Gunn tries to clarify 
his point by asking the reader to imagine that instead of creating species we would be 
re-creating an individual. After all, species consists of individuals. In fact this is exactly 
what happens when scientists use the DNA of an individual (a museum specimen) and 
recreate that specific individual at least genetically speaking. He asks the reader to 
imagine a situation where scientists would recreate Jeremy Bentham from the cells of 
his body. The recreated Jeremy Bentham would certainly be genetically identical to the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
examples of null classes. He uses an example of an army. During war an army has members (soldiers), 
however, during peace time it becomes a null class. (Gunn 1991, 298.) 
78 However, there are examples in nature that support this third definition. For example annual plants 
“whose entire population dies off each year. The seeds, which are all that survive the winter, are genes, 
not plants.” (Gunn 1991, 300.) 
82 
 
original, but are they the same individual? Gunn claims that the answer is no. (Gunn 
1991, 301.) What makes an individual or a species what it is, is the history it has, the 
experiences and the connections to other organisms that it has. We believe that humans 
and species are more than just DNA. This is exactly Elliot’s point, that history and 
origins matters. 
 
Gunn’s presents another example. Imagine the evolution of two practically identical 
organisms. Imagine that they evolved at separate times, organism A let us say 1000 BC 
and organism B 1000 years later. Would we or the scientific community consider these 
two species as the same? Or imagine that they evolved at the same time but in the 
opposite parts of the world. Again it is difficult to imagine that these two species would 
be considered to be the same. (Gunn 1991, 299.) The reason for this is that the 
“classification is supposed to exhibit evolutionary relationships, not mere 
morphological similarities: to provide explanations and not merely descriptions” (Gunn 
1991, 300). Why should we make an exception when it comes to de-extinction? Also I 
believe that the word “species” has in a similar way to the concept of “natural” a very 
important link with its origin and with its historical continuity, to the way it has come 
about through evolution. It matters if a species evolved naturally, became extinct and 
was revived by humans. If we consider it from this perspective, how do we explain the 
1000 years that the species did not exist?  
 
There are some disturbing techniques being used in de-extinction technology. For 
instance, chickens serving as surrogate mothers and giving birth to falcons (Brand 2013, 
Ted Talk). This definitely would be termed by Katz, Elliot and probably most 
environmental philosophers as non-natural and possibly even crossing the line. This 
certainly would not happen in nature if it were not for human intervention. There is also 
another issue apparent in this example. Genes do not dominate everything when it 
comes to species, some parts of what makes a species is behaviour. A chicken is a 
chicken because of the way it acts. These behaviour patterns are partly embedded in the 
genome and partly in learning by examining the behaviour of their parents and other 
members of the species.  
 
According to the Revive and Restore website, “[o]nly species whose DNA is too old to 
be recovered, such as dinosaurs, are the ones to consider totally extinct, bodily and 
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genetically” (Brand 2013, National Geographic News). Throughout this analysis it 
becomes more apparent that de-extinction is not restoration but replication at best. It 
ignores one of the main goals for restoration, historical fidelity. De-extinction is not 
creating a narrative between the past and the present. I am not making a judgement of 
whether we should go ahead with de-extinction, I am only arguing that it is not, and 
should not be considered a form of restoration. 
6.3. Hubris – restoration as an embodiment of human arrogance 
The issue of de-extinction creates a setting for our third issue, hubris. One important 
problem with ecological restoration that has been voiced by many philosophers and 
environmentalists is hubris. It refers to the excessive pride or self-confidence expressed 
by a person. Katz is one of the philosophers accusing restoration of hubris and argues 
that restoration displays over-estimation of human capabilities and arrogance. Katz 
states that, restoration mistakenly assumes that we are able to restore nature not noticing 
that it impossible because the outcome of restoration is not nature but an artefact.  
 
I find hubris an interesting concept as it indicates what the appropriate place for humans 
is in the world. It provides limits to appropriate human action by indicating what 
humans cannot and should not do. Hubris is associated with arrogance and over-
estimated sense of human capabilities and loss of the sense of reality. Believing that 
environmental degradation can always be fixed by restoration can lead to unwarranted 
expectation of human capabilities. Are these accusations warranted?  
 
Throop argues that virtues can help fight against hubris (and other vices). The healing 
metaphor that was outlined in chapter five corresponds to the following virtues: 
“humility, respect, sensitivity and self-restraint” (Throop 2012, 55). Humility “is 
primarily an epistemic virtue” that corresponds to the realisation of one’s limits, 
knowledge and abilities to control one’s surroundings. Hubris is humility’s antonym. 
Hubris is defined as being unaware of ones limits which often leads to mistakes and 
failure. This is why humility is an important value for healer to exemplify. Because of 
the lack of ecological knowledge and due to the complexity of ecological systems, 
humility is a desirable virtue for restorationists to embody. (Throop 2012, 55.) 
Humility, sensitivity and self-restraint emphasise conservative restoration goals. 
Respecting historical continuity expresses humility. Large scale environmental 
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manipulation (especially if creating a completely novel ecosystem) expresses hubris. 
Ecologists are especially aware of the lack of knowledge in facing climate change with 
the category of uncertainties is becoming more extensive. Returning an ecosystem to 
predisturbance conditions requires the least amount of knowledge and therefore, is the 
safest option. (Throop 2012, 56-57.) After all, natural ecosystems exhibit two to three 
billion years of experience, whereas human built environments cannot get close to 
matching this, considering that ecological restoration as a practice properly emerged in 
the 1980s. As long as we are adopting the healing metaphor with our means and hold on 
to the goals (historical fidelity, ecological integrity and moral integrity), it is possible to 
safeguard the restoration project from hubris. The issue with hubris highlights why it is 
so important to define restoration clearly. 
6.4. Climate change – the demise of restoration? 
Climate change poses a real threat to the future of ecological restoration. The first clue 
is in the name “climate change”. As discussed earlier ecological restoration has a special 
and important relationship with the past. Climate change challenges the insistence of 
returning a damaged ecosystem back to predisturbance conditions. Historical fidelity 
can only be amended if the historical reference points are achievable. Historical fidelity 
requires linking the present to the past. Therefore, it might be obvious what kind of 
threat lurks in the future. If the past conditions are no longer available due to the 
changed climate this might very well render ecological restoration impossible. If 
restorationists are unable to restore destroyed ecosystems to their former condition, does 
this mean that ecological restoration has come to its end? 
 
Climate change raises a serious issue to restoration that must be addressed. Light writes 
that for some restorationists climate change will ease the grip of historical reference 
conditions in the future and for others it will generate an existential crisis (Light 2012, 
105-106). Unfortunately even in the best case scenarios the temperature has been 
predicted to rise two degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial levels (Light 2012, 106; 
IPCC, 2013, 20). In fact “[m]ost aspects of climate change will persist for many 
centuries even if emissions of CO2 are stopped” (IPCC 2013, 27). This will affect how 
ecosystems function and will likely lead to changes in ecosystems. This could go in two 
directions, it might either render restoration impossible, which is largely a question of 
how we chose to define restoration or it would mean more work for restorationists.  
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Light identifies “twin moving targets” that test the ground underneath ecological 
restoration. Firstly, due to climate change species and even entire ecosystems seem to 
be moving, often towards cooler climates. The second being that even the definition of 
ecological restoration appears to be on the move. Light identifies “many of the core 
principles of the field are changing”. (Light 2012, 106.) Looking at three definitions 
formulated by SER over the years (found in chapter one), what is noticeable is the 
reference to historical fidelity becomes weaker over the years and finally disappears in 
the last definition. Even though reference to historical fidelity is not directly present in 
the 2002 definition it is “still strongly implied”. (Light 2012, 108.) Light argues that 
climate change does not inevitably lead to the end of ecological restoration, as the future 
of ecological restoration depends on how restoration practitioners respond to the 
challenge posed by climate change. That is, if restoration practitioners “continue to 
disentangle restoration from narrow expectations of historical fidelity that do not reflect 
the current state of restoration practice” (Light 2012, 106). In fact, Light argues that the 
threat of climate change contains within it an opportunity to accentuate the role of social 
and cultural goals in ecological restoration projects. (Light 2012, 107-120.)  
 
I have identified two issues with climate change that are related to each other. Either we 
hold on tightly to historical fidelity and aim to restore exact pre-disturbance conditions 
and risk ecological integrity. After all, persistence to return to the pre-disturbance 
structure might lead to a failure of several restoration projects. (Throop 2012, 48.) Or 
we loosen the grip on historical integrity and concentrate more firmly on ecological 
integrity and moral integrity highlighting the importance of public participation. If the 
grip on historical fidelity is loosened, how does restoration stand out from other forms 
of environmental management? Some might see this as an opportunity: climate change 
releasing restorationists from the chains that had previously affixed them to the past. 
Could this lead to new opportunities to create new type of ecosystems or should 
restorationists only reorient restoration goals? (Throop 2012, 48.) 
 
One of the biggest issues with climate change is its sheer complexity and size; 
  
the issue of climate change is neither understandable, nor experience-able, nor alterable at the individual 
level […] significant change can only be the result of the cumulative efforts of large groups of people 
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aggregated over long periods of time. Thinking like a planet, in order to mean anything, must therefore 
represent a collective undertaking. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 322)  
 
We can only achieve a real difference by the collective efforts of large groups of people 
on a global scale over a significant amount of time. Thinking like a planet demonstrates 
how little can be achieved in a human life-time. (Hirsch and Norton 2012, 322.) 
Thinking like a planet provides a good framework to reassess the concept of ecological 
restoration. The concept cannot be defined by only looking to the past, but it must also 
be linked into the future. Climate change does challenge the goal of historical fidelity. 
In the face of climate change, restorationists need to be able to justify their insistence on 
historical fidelity as an important goal, even when these historical conditions are no 
longer viable, or they need to reject history (Throop 2012, 47). However, if the past is 
abandoned it would mean to “lose a critically important moral justification for 
restoration. Although climate change should shape the way history constrains goal 
selection, it should not unhinge restoration from history” (Throop 2012, 48). Throop 
argues that one is faithful to a historic ecosystem if the area would have evolved 
anyway as a consequence of climate change had the place not been disturbed. Or if one 
is able to restore the ecosystem close to what is was prior to destruction. (Throop 2012, 
50.) I agree with Throop that historical fidelity needs to accommodate the possibility of 
ecological change. The metaphor of thinking like a planet gives us a wider context to 
facilitate this change. It allows us to gaze far into the past and the future, reminding that 
ecosystems are constantly evolving and our understanding of ecosystems must change 
accordingly. If we think like a planet we will still respect and use the past as reference, 
but would not be imprisoned by the past allowing change into the equation, as long as 
that change is natural. As long as the restoration project concentrates on assisted 
recovery the ecosystem will be able to evolve uninterrupted towards the future.  
7. Conclusion 
What I have aimed to show in this thesis is the full complexity that lies behind the 
debate of ecological restoration. I by no means claim that I have solved these issues, but 
I have aimed to show the difficulties that must be faced if one aims to understand 
ecological restoration. I have also aimed to put forth arguments that will help 
understand ecological restoration in its full complexity. Ecological restoration is an 
interdisciplinary venture which combines the forces of humanities, social scientists and 
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natural scientists. Staying within one’s own comfort zone or within one’s own discipline 
will not suffice if one is aiming to fully understand ecological restoration. Restoration 
goes to the very heart of environmental philosophy, to the very heart of our 
understanding of ecology and our understanding of humanity and most importantly to 
the very heart of our understanding of the world and our place in it. This is what I 
learned whilst writing this thesis, which I must admit, I was not fully prepared for. I was 
prepared to study the challenging topic of restoration, however, I was not aware how 
complicated and how far fetching its remit really is. I believe ecological restoration will 
not achieve its full potential or acceptance if academics from different fields do not 
work together. The task would be a lot easier if ecologists understood the philosophical 
and ethical grounding of their work and why they are aiming to restore in the first place 
and if philosophers understood how ecology works, how ecosystems came about and 
what the suitable role for humans would be in all of this. 
In this thesis, I have aimed to show the two important lessons that ecological restoration 
can teach us. First, it has forced us to truly scrutinise and re-evaluate the relationship 
between humans and nature. Secondly, the dichotomy between humans and nature has 
forced us to define what nature actually is and what nature means to us. This has been 
and will continue to be an invaluable task in finding our place in the biotic community. I 
have aimed to show that human action, in particular, has an important role to play in 
what constitutes as natural. After all, I have claimed, what appears to disturb naturalness 
is action and more importantly particular types of actions. Naturalness in human action 
also seems to come in degrees. I believe Borgmann’s device paradigm and examination 
of different understandings of nature (such as how indigenous people perceive nature) 
can bring the importance of action into the surface. Thinking like a planet metaphor can 
be used to fit certain human actions into nature.  
I have argued that using the categories of goals, values, means and overall attitude is an 
extremely useful way of uncovering important characteristics and difficult problems 
within the concept of restoration. All of these categories play a vital role in contributing 
toward the concept of restoration. However, I believe that we must pay specific 
attention to values in order to safeguard restoration projects from turning into malicious 
restoration. In addition, values demand us to ensure that we also restore our moral 
character and our relationship with nature. I believe this is the only way to truly restore 
a place. I have emphasised the fundamental role of the concept of nature in the task of 
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defining ecological restoration. As I have shown, not paying much attention or time to 
this fundamental concept will lead to problems with the consistency of the theory of 
ecological restoration one is aiming to put forth. In addition, it is important not to 
confuse restoration activity with the activity that caused the destruction in the first 
place. 
How can restoration achieve all its goals: ecological integrity, historical fidelity and 
moral integrity? In the words of Clewell and Aronson, I have argued that the best way is 
to understand ecological restoration as “a powerful metaphor, and a path to follow in 
troubled times, which has captured the imagination, hearts, and minds of people 
globally” (Clewell and Aronson 2013, 5). Ecological restoration itself works as a 
metaphor, but we should also “think like the planet” to ensure that we comprehend and 
understand the full context of our actions. In addition, “thinking like a planet” allows 
restoration practices to be flexible and site-specific, but at the same time it holds general 
important goals that help to measure what counts as a good restoration project globally. 
The healing metaphor serves as an invaluable metaphor to guide the means of the 
restoration projects.  
Susan Mills has been able to put into words the essence of restoration: “[i]t is what can 
be done when it’s too late to conserve. The object is not to reinstate some static idyll, 
but to restore the dynamic of evolution in an ecosystem and to include the human in that 
dynamic” (Mills 1995, 45).  It has been a long and bumpy road to the realisation of what 
we have done to our planet, which has then led to the development of ecological 
restoration. It is with regret and with hope that I quote: “[a]n enormous price has been 
paid for this consciousness” (Mills 1995, 51).79 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
79 David Simpson in a personal conversation with Susan Mills (Mills 1995, 51). 
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